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I. INTRODUCTION
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and
local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great
expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the im-
portance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the
performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in
the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today,
it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in
* Associate Professor, North Carolina Central University School of Law.
** J.D. 2007, North Carolina Central University School of Law.
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preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to ad-
just normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any
child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the
opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has
undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all
on equal terms.1
More than half a century has passed since Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation declared unlawful the long-standing national policy of "sepa-
rate but equal" 2 and changed the face of American public school
education. The doctrine of "separate but equal" permitted states and
local school districts to maintain dual school systems, one for whites,
another for African-Americans, and "created gross and obvious dis-
parities" in the educational opportunities available to African-Ameri-
can public school children.3 Today, education remains a paramount
responsibility of state and local governments. As Justice Robert Orr
of the North Carolina Supreme Court recently observed:
The world economy and technological advances of the twenty-first
century mandate the necessity that the State step forward, boldly and
decisively, to see that all children, without regard to their socio-eco-
nomic circumstances, have an educational opportunity and experience
that not only meet the constitutional mandates set forth in Leandro,
but fulfill the dreams and aspirations of the founders of our state and
nation. Assuring that our children are afforded the chance to become
contributing, constructive members of society is paramount.
4
Yet, now, fifty plus years after the decision in Brown v. Board of
Education, policies of zero tolerance, widely adopted by public school
systems nationwide, have spawned a second generation of discrimina-
tion in our public schools.5 Broadly defined, zero tolerance policies
1. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (Warren, C.J., for the majority).
2. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding the segregation of white and
"colored" railway passengers as a reasonable law to preserve the peace and public order).
3. Avarita L. Hanson, Have Zero Tolerance School Discipline Policies Turned into a
Nightmare? The American Dream's Promise of Equal Educational Opportunity Grounded in
Brown v. Board of Education, 9 U.C. DAVIS J. Juv. L. & PoL'Y 289, 291 (2005) [hereinafter
Hanson]. "Schools catering to only African-Americans had less trained and paid teachers, higher
pupil-teacher ratios, fewer curricular and extra-curricular activities, and poor physical plants to
which these students had to travel further and longer than white children." Id.
4. Hoke County Bd. of Educ. v. State, 599 S.E.2d 365, 397 (N.C. 2004) "In Leandro, this
Court, in sum, decreed that the State and State Board of Education had constitutional obliga-
tions to provide the state's school children with an opportunity for a sound basic education, and
that the state's school children had a fundamental right to such an opportunity." Id. at 376 (citing
Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 257 (N.C. 1997)).
5. Libero Della Piana, Reading, Writing, Race and Resegregation: 45 Years After Brown v.
Board of Education, 4 COLORLINES (Spring 1999), available at http://www.colorlines.com/arti-
cle.php?ID=107. See also Ira Glasser and Alan Levine, Bringing Student Rights to New York
City's School System, 1 J. L. & EDUC. 213 (1972) (finding a refined system of suspension and
expulsion punishments toward black students the results of which were so profound and effec-
tive that "southern style" segregation was unnecessary).
2
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are "administrative rules intended to address specific problems associ-
ated with school safety and discipline."6 "Most state and local zero
tolerance school policies have their genesis in the Gun Free School
Act of 1994,"' intended by Congress to promote school safety by de-
claring zero tolerance for weapons in public schools.8
"Over time, however, zero tolerance has come to refer to school or
district-wide policies that mandate pre-determined, typically harsh,
consequences or punishments (such as suspension and expulsion) for a
wide degree of rule violation."9 School authorities have "extended
what appeared to be a necessary, fair, limited, and specific response to
school violence provided by federal law into areas neither contem-
plated nor addressed by the initial enactment."'" In many school dis-
tricts, zero tolerance now applies to "frequent and usual student
behaviors - minor, disruptive behaviors, such as tardiness, class ab-
sences, disrespect, and noncompliance,"" as well as any conduct iden-
tified by school officials as "gang-related."
On the whole, zero tolerance policies adopted by local school
boards, particularly policies prohibiting "gang-related" conduct, are
poorly drafted and fail "to balance the need for school safety with
6. Hanson, supra note 3, at 301 (citing Tobin McAndrews, Zero Tolerance Policies, ERIC
Dig. No. 146, Mar. 2001, available at http://eric.uoregon.edu/publications/digests/digest146.html).
7. James M. Peden, Through a Glass Darkly: Educating with Zero Tolerance, 10 KAN. J. L.
& PUB. POL'Y 369, 372 (2001) [hereinafter Peden].
8. 20 U.S.C. § 8921(b)(1) (2000) (repealed 2002). (The Act mandated that all states re-
ceiving Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) funds adopt a policy under which any
student determined to have brought a weapon to school would be suspended from school for not
less than one year. Although Congress repealed The Gun-Free Schools Act with the enactment
of the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, under No Child Left Behind, the Gun-Free Schools
Act was re-enacted as 20 U.S.C. § 1751(b)(1)).
9. The National Association of School Psychologists, Zero Tolerance and Alternative Strat-
egies: A Fact Sheet for Educators and Policymakers, http://www.naspcenter.org/factsheets/
ztfs.html. See also Hanson, supra note 3, at 301 (citing Phillip Kaufman et al., U.S. Dep't of
Educ. & U.S. Dep't of Justice, Indicators of School Crime and Safety, app. A, at 121 (1998)
(defining zero tolerance as a policy that "mandates predetermined consequences or punishments
for specific offenses")); HARVARD UNIV., ADVANCEMENT PROJECT & THE CIVIL RIGHTS PRO-
JECT, Opportunities Suspended: The Devastating Consequences of Zero Tolerance and School
Discipline Policies 1 (2000) [hereinafter, OPPORTUNITIES SUSPENDED] (defining zero tolerance
policies as "nondiscretionary punishment guidelines"), at http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.
edu/research/discipline/final-report.pdf.
Zero tolerance is a term that is used to characterize an institution's responses to breaches in
the code of conduct which the institution recognizes as being fundamental to its operation.
It carries with it a connotation of absolutism and inflexibility which implies that once pa-
rameters of conduct have been established for any particular institution, no activity that
occurs outside those parameters will be allowed. A code of conduct premised on such a
concept does not contemplate an individual's intent.
Peden, supra note 7, at 371.
10. Hanson, at 308-09.
11. Id. at 321-22 (citing Russell J. Skiba, Zero Tolerance, Zero Evidence: An Analysis of
School Disciplinary Practice, Ind. Educ. Policy Ctr., Policy Research Rept. #SRS2, 6 (Aug.
2000)), available at www.indiana.edu/-safeschl/ztze.pdf).
3
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maintaining educational opportunity for students. '1 2 Under the guise
of protecting school safety, zero tolerance denies a public school edu-
cation and creates a "schoolhouse-to-jailhouse" pathway for a statisti-
cally indefensible number of minority students.
Numerous accounts lead to the same issue and conclusion: School au-
thorities disproportionately target African-American (and Latino)
students for discipline. Much like the minority experience in other
settings, minority students are subject to racial profiling in the applica-
tion of zero tolerance policies.... It is found with clear and convinc-
ing evidence that minority students receive more harsh punitive
measures (suspension, expulsion, corporal punishment) and less mild
discipline than their non-minority peers, even controlling for socio-
economic status.' 3
African-American children represent 17% of public school enroll-
ment nationwide, but 33% of all out-of-school suspensions. 4 White
students, on the other hand, represent 63% of public school enroll-
ment, but only 50% of out-of-school suspensions. 5 Also, Latino stu-
dents are singled out for discipline. In Tennessee, for example, more
than 38% of Latino public school students have been suspended.' 6
"Minority children are clearly being profiled for application of zero
tolerance policies and bearing a disproportionate brunt of its
effects."17
12. Id. at 311. "[W]hile expulsion and suspension may be necessary tools for maintaining
school safety, overuse and overapplication of these tools is viewed by some advocates as counter
to 'the fundamental purpose of public education - the purpose of preparing children to live in a
democratic society."' Id. at 316 (quoting William Haft, More Than Zero Tolerance: The Cost of
Zero Tolerance and the Case for Restorative Justice in Schools, 77 DENV. U. L. REV. 795, 797
(2000)).
13. Id. at 332-33 (citing CHARLES J. OGLETREE, JR., ALL DELIBERATE SPEED: REFLEC-
TIONS ON THE FIRST HALF CENTURY OF BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION 302 (W.W. Norton &
Co. 2004); see La Griffe du Lion, Racial Disparities in School Discipline, Vol. 3, Number 3 (June
2001), available at http://www.lagriffedulion.f2s.com/discipline.htm; See also La Griffe du Lion,
Closing the Racial Learning Gap (Jan. 2004), Vol. 6, Number 1, available at http://www.lagrif-
fedulion.f2s.com/gap.htm.
[M]any school districts to subject minority students, particularly low-income African Ameri-
can males, to disproportionate amounts of punishment. Based ostensibly upon their desire
to maintain a safe and orderly environment, a number of school districts engage in discipli-
nary practices that result in large numbers of minority students being suspended and ex-
pelled from school.
Pedro A. Noguera, School Reform and Second Generation Discrimination: Toward the Develop-
ment of Equitable Schools IN MOTION MAGAZINE, Oct. 15, 2006, available at http://www.inmo-
tionmagazine.com/er/pn-second.html.
14. See Harvard University Civil Rights Project, Action Kit, Civil Rights in Brief- Zero Tol-
erance and School Discipline, [hereinafter Action Kit] available at http://www.civilrightsproject.
harvard.edu.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Hanson, supra note 3, at 334 (citing Bobby lafolla, School-to-Prison Pipeline, BOSTON'S
WEEKLY DIG, (July 1, 2003), available at http://www.weeklydig.com/news-opinions/articles/
schooltoprisonpipeline_2) (New "zero tolerance" approaches to discipline have almost doubled
4
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Students of color are more likely to receive suspension for non-vio-
lent, minor misconduct such as disobedience, disruption, and disre-
spect of authority. 8 Research shows that these disparities are not due
to poverty or inherently bad behavior, 9 but instead, are largely the
result of racial and cultural bias by public school officials.2" Available
empirical evidence suggests, for example, that such common behavior
as student inattention is often viewed differently, depending on race.
White teachers tend to interpret the inattentiveness of black students
''as resulting from the students' putative low attention spans," while
the same behavior by white students is viewed merely as "an indica-
tion that the teacher needed to do more to gain the student's
interest."2
Beverly Cross, an urban education specialist at the University of
Wisconsin-Madison says that, "Racism rests just beneath the surface
of zero-tolerance decisions."22 In large part, black students are ex-
cluded because of what has been called "the 'hidden curriculum' or
rules with respect to obedience to authority, time schedules, cutting
class, and in some instances, fighting with other students. While white
the number of students suspended annually in the last 30 years, from 1.7 million to 3.1 million,
while the total number of students enrolled in elementary and high schools has stayed flat since
1970 at about 50 million. Minorities have been disproportionately punished. According to the
Department of Education's Office of Civil Rights, black students are 2.6 times more likely to be
suspended than white students. The Department of Education's Office of Special Education
Programs showed a similar racial inequality in the percentage of students suspended for more
than one day from 1972 to 2000. For white students, the percentage rose from 3.1 percent to 5.09
percent; for black students, it rose from 6 percent to 13.2 percent.).
18. Vincent Schiraldi & Jason Ziedenberg, Self-Reported Crime and the Growing Use of
Suspensions (November 30, 2001), available at http://www.justicepolicy.org/reports/sss.pdf.
There are disturbing racial disparities in student suspension rates by race, specifically with
respect to black male students. In school year 1974-5, 65.7% of suspended students were
white, 28.7% were African American, and 5% were Hispanic. By 1998, after the total num-
ber of suspended students doubled, whites represented 51.3% of suspended students; Afri-
can Americans 32.7%; and Hispanics 14.5%.
Id. (citing Office of Civil Rights, U.S. Department of Education, Projected Student Suspension
Rate Values for the Nation's Public Schools, by Race and Ethnicity-Elementary and Secondary
School Civil Rights Compliance Reports (2000)). The Condition of Education 1997, published by
the U.S. Department of Education, found that almost 25% of all African American male stu-
dents were suspended at least once over a four-year period. Id. See also OPPORTUNITIES SUS-
PENDED, supra note 9.
19. Action Kit, supra note 14.
20. Rebecca Gordon, Libero Della Piana, & Terry Keleher, Facing the Consequences: An
Examination of Racial Discrimination in U.S. Public Schools, ERASE Initiative (Expose Racism
& Advance School Excellence) (March 2000), available at http://www.arc.org/pdf/196apdf.pdf.
21. Roni R. Reed, Education and the State Constitutions: Alternatives for Suspended and
Expelled Students, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 582, 608 (1996) (citing EILEEN McGUIRE, TEACHER-
STUDENT INTERACTION, IN CHILDREN AT RISK 177 (Joan M. Lakebrink ed., 1989)).
22. JUDITH BROWNE, DANIEL LOSEN & JOHANNA WALD, ZERO TOLERANCE: UNFAIR,
WITH LITTLE RECOURSE, IN ZERO TOLERANCE: CAN SUSPENSION AND EXPULSION KEEP
SCHOOLS SAFE? (Russell Skiba and Gil Noam, eds., 2001). Cross contributed to a 2001 study of
racial profiling and punishment in U.S. public schools published by the Applied Research
Center's ERASE Initiative.
5
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students are punished for the same activities, discipline of whites is
imposed at disproportionately lower rates. '2 3  Students of color are
routinely denied the same educational opportunities provided to
white students most often as a consequence of racially disparate disci-
plinary actions imposed without due process of law.24
Equally alarming is the increasing frequency with which school dis-
ciplinary proceedings, especially for students of color, result in referral
to the juvenile justice or adult justice system.25  "[A]ctions formerly
considered childish or adolescent acts, even actions where there is no
violence, such as having a pager at school, have taken on or been
given criminal definition, along with criminal consequences. ' '2 6  Not
surprisingly, the negative effects of these policies fall disproportion-
ately on children of color.27
"Zero tolerance enforcement is clearly a civil rights issue - perhaps
the most compelling issue to be addressed in the context of Brown in
the new millennium. '28  Constitutional challenges to zero tolerance
23. Patrick Pauken & Philip T.K. Daniel, Race Discrimination and Disability Discrimination
in School Discipline: A Legal and Statistical Analysis, 139 ED. LAW REP. 759, 767 (West 2000)
(citing Mark Yudof, Suspension and Expulsion of Black Students from the Public Schools: Aca-
demic Punishment and the Constitution, 39 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 375, 377 (1975)).
24. Judith A. Browne, The Advancement Project, DERAILED: The Schoolhouse to Jail-
house Track, [hereinafter DERAILED], available at http://www.advancementproject.org (noting
that even the African-American children who attend private schools cannot escape racist inter-
pretations of zero tolerance policies).
25. Hanson, supra note 3, at 328 (citing OPPORTUNITIES SUSPENDED, supra note 9, at 13
(finding that school districts "are simply transferring their disciplinary authority to law enforce-
ment officials" and that 41 states require schools to report students to law enforcement agencies
for various conduct committed in school, fail to monitor implementation of referrals, and "per-
haps unintentionally, set off an explosion in the criminalization of children for understandable
mistakes or ordinary childhood behavior.")).
26. Hanson, supra note 3, at 329 (citing Sara Rimer, Unruly Students Facing Arrest, Not
Detention, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2004, at 1 (City and suburban schools nationwide are increasingly
sending students to the juvenile justice system for adolescent behaviors such as "shouting at
classmates and violating the dress code" that used to be handled by school administrators.)).
"[I]nstead of addressing discipline of students at the school level, our children are being treated
as criminals - in the scheme of the criminal justice system - and without much of the legal protec-
tions afforded to adults charged with criminal violations." Id. (citing Kathleen M. Cerrone, The
Gun-Free Schools Act of 1994: Zero Tolerance Takes Aim at Procedural Due Process, 20 PACE L.
REV. 131, 164-75 (1999)).
27. DERAILED, supra note 24 (citing DELAWARE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, ANNUAL
REPORT OF SCHOOL CLIMATE AND STUDENT CONDUCT, (1999-2000); OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUS-
TICE AND DELINQUENCY PROGRAMS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Challenging the Myths,
1999 National Report Series, Juvenile Justice Bulletin. (2000).
Despite common stereotypical beliefs by some about urban school children and African-
American children, the profile of a gun-toting student who was likely to go on a killing
rampage was not an urban black male, but was more likely to be a rural or small town white
male who had readier access to guns.
Hanson, supra note 3, at 344.
28. Hanson, supra note 3, at 336-37 (citing National Association of Secondary School Prin-
cipals, Statement on the Civil Rights Implications of Zero Tolerance Programs before the United
States Commission on Civil Rights, Feb. 18, 2000 (advocating that discretion is needed to ensure
6
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generally allege violations of equal protection and procedural or sub-
stantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, or that the
policy itself is void for vagueness. 29 Regrettably, case law examining
zero tolerance policies has been slow to develop, primarily because
"many parents often do not have the mindset, time, or means to pur-
sue redress against the educational 'system' beyond the administrative
process through the courts, and the parents who do have the resources
are often ostracized, frustrated, and unsuccessful."30
This article seeks to assist practitioners in identifying claims of sec-
ond-generation discrimination against local school systems based on
racially disparate enforcement of zero tolerance policies.3" It first sets
out potential federal and state constitutional claims based on viola-
tions of equal protection, procedural due process, and vagueness.32 It
concludes by identifying several defenses school systems commonly
offer to escape accountability for perpetuating second generation seg-
regation and depriving children of color of their constitutionally guar-
anteed equal access to a basic public education.
equal treatment of students), available at http://www.principals.org/publicaffairs/pszerojtol.
html). See Daniel J. Losen & Christopher Edley Jr., The Role of Law in Policing Abusive Disci-
plinary Practices: Why School Discipline Is a Civil Rights Issue, in ZERO TOLERANCE 230-55
(William Ayers, Bernardine Dohrn & Rick Ayers eds., 2001).
29. Hanson, supra note 3, at 360. See OPPORTUNITIES SUSPENDED, supra note 9, Appendix
II, Legal Protections for Students Facing Zero Tolerance Policies, for a more detailed legal dis-
course on challenges to zero tolerance policies). See also Alicia C. Insley, Comment, Suspending
and Expelling Children from Educational Opportunity: Time to Reevaluate Zero Tolerance Poli-
cies, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1039 (2001) (generally explaining zero tolerance policies, means of chal-
lenging them, their effects on school students, and general ineffectiveness). "The importance of
an education to a child is substantial, and the state cannot condition its availability upon compli-
ance with an unconstitutionally vague standard of conduct." Myers v. Arcata Union High Sch.
Dist., 75 Cal. Rptr. 68, 74-5 (1969) (citations omitted) (high school district governing board's
"dress policy" concerning hair styles, which provided that "extremes of hair style are not accept-
able," found unconstitutionally vague). See infra text accompanying notes 164-179.
30. Hanson, supra note 3, at 295 (citing IRWIN A. HYMAN & PATRICIA A. SNOOK, DANGER-
OUS SCHOOLS: WHAT WE CAN Do ABOUT THE PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL ABUSE OF OUR
CHILDREN (Jossey-Bass Inc., Publishers 1999)).
There are relatively few reported court cases involving school discipline, probably for sev-
eral reasons. School discipline matters are primarily handled in administrative proceedings
that have usually been unreported, at least in traditional written legal reports. The courts in
which juveniles usually appear are not courts of record. Additionally, it may be posited that
few families can bear the expense of litigating these matters that may involve difficult con-
stitutional claims and require attorneys. Few cases have reached the courts, but those cases
that have been litigated demonstrate the common law, statutes, facts, and theories used to
uphold zero tolerance applications.
Id. at 356-57.
31. See, e.g., Copper v. Denlinger, 06 CVS 03257 (N.C. filed Mar. 24, 2006), appeal dock-
eted, No. COA07-205, (N.C. Ct. App. Feb, 14, 2007).
32. This article is intended as the first in a series. Follow-up articles will include discussion
of other constitutional and state law claims, such as discrimination claims under Title VI and 42
U.S.C. § 1981, conspiracy to violate civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 and N.C. Gen. Stat. Ch.
99D, defamation, and negligent supervision, personal and official liability, available remedies,
class actions, and pretrial litigation strategies.
7
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II. CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS
The primary vehicle for bringing a Fourteenth Amendment equal
protection or due process claim is 42 U.S.C. § 1983 which states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State of Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceedings for redress.33
"Person" within the meaning of § 1983 includes local boards of educa-
tion, superintendents, and other school officials. 34 Even in state court,
federal law controls actions brought under § 1983. 35
"One whose equal protection or due process rights have been
abridged [by a State actor also] has a direct claim under the North
Carolina Constitution."36
The civil rights guaranteed by the Declaration of Rights in Article I of
our Constitution are individual and personal rights entitled to protec-
tion against state action under the rationale adopted in the above-
cited authorities. The Declaration of Rights was passed by the Consti-
tutional Convention on 17 December 1776, the day before the Consti-
tution itself was adopted, manifesting the primacy of the Declaration
in the minds of the framers. The fundamental purpose for its adoption
was to provide citizens with protection from the State's encroachment
upon these rights. Encroachment by the State is, of course, accom-
plished by the acts of individuals who are clothed with the authority of
33. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). Although beyond the scope of this article, § 1981 may provide
another avenue to challenge racially discriminatory school disciplinary policies. Originally en-
acted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, Act Apr. 9, 1866, c. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, § 1981
provides, "All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and Terri-
tory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real
and personal property." The Supreme Court has held that students have a protectable property
interest in a public school education. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975). See also Leandro
v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 259 (N.C. 1997) (The North Carolina Constitution "guarantee[s] every
child of the state the opportunity to receive a 'sound basic education ....').
34. Monell v. Dep't of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Ripellino v. N.C. Sch. Bds. Ass'n,
627 S.E.2d 225, (N.C. Ct. App. 2006).
35. NLRB v. Natural Gas Util. Dist. of Hawkins County, 402 U.S. 600, 603-04 (1971) (fed-
eral law controls actions brought under federal law). See also, White v. Pate, 304 S.E.2d 199
(N.C. 1983); Constantian v. Anson County, 93 S.E.2d 163 (N.C. 1956); Ripellino v. N.C. Sch.
Bds. Ass'n, 627 S.E.2d 225, (N.C. Ct. App. 2006); Dobrowolska v. Wall, 530 S.E.2d 590 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2000); Fennell v. Stephenson, 528 S.E.2d 911 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000), rev'd on other grounds,
554 S.E.2d 629 (N.C. 2001).
36. Corum v. Univ. of N.C., 413 S.E.2d 276, 289 (N.C. 1992) (citing Sale v. Highway
Comm'n, 89 S.E.2d 290 (N.C. 1955)). "It is clear, then, that equal access to participation in our
public school system is a fundamental right, guaranteed by our state constitution and protected
by considerations of procedural due process." Sneed v. Greensboro City Bd. of Ed., 264 S.E.2d
106, 113 (N.C. 1980) (citing U.S. CONST., amend. XIV; N.C. CONST., art. I, § 19; Givens v. Poe,
346 F. Supp. 202 (W.D.N.C. 1972)).
8
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the State. The very purpose of the Declaration of Rights is to ensure
that the violation of these rights is never permitted by anyone who
might be invested under the Constitution with the powers of the
State.37
Although not directly controlling, federal decisions are highly persua-
sive in actions alleging State constitutional claims.38
A. Equal Protection
We are confronted primarily with a moral issue. It is as old as the
Scriptures and is as clear as the American Constitution.
-- John F. Kennedy39
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states,
"No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." 0 Similarly, the North Carolina Constitution
states, "No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws;
nor shall any person be subjected to discrimination by the State be-
cause of race, color, religion, or national origin."'" The North Caro-
lina Constitution further provides that, "[t]he people have a right to
the privilege of education, '"42 and "public schools shall be maintained
... wherein equal opportunities shall be provided for all students.
' a3
Equal Protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment and Ar-
ticle I, section 19 can be used to challenge school disciplinary actions
or policies where disparate treatment can be traced, at least in part, to
racial hostility on the part of school officials."a "The central purpose
37. Corum, 413 S.E.2d at 289-290 (1992) (citing State v. Manuel, 20 N.C. 144 (1838)).
38. See, e.g., Toomer v. Garrett, 574 S.E.2d 76, 86 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002) ("Decisions as to the
scope of procedural due process provided by the federal constitution are highly persuasive with
respect to that afforded under our state constitution.").
39. John F. Kennedy, Civil Rights Address (June 11, 1963) (transcript available at http://
www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/j fkcivilrights.htm).
40. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
41. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 19. See Corum, 413 S.E.2d at 289 (N.C. 1992) ("The civil rights
guaranteed by the Declaration of Rights in Article I of our Constitution are individual and per-
sonal rights entitled to protection against state action ...."). "The Supreme Court of North
Carolina has held that the guarantee of equal protection provided in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the Federal Constitution has been expressly incorporated in Article I, § 19 of the N.C.
Constitution, and thus the same analysis may be applied to both." Toomer, 574 S.E.2d at 88
(N.C. Ct. App. 2002) (citing Richardson v. N.C. Dept. of Corr., 478 S.E.2d 501, 505 (N.C. 1996));
S.S. Kresge Co. v. Davis, 178 S.E.2d 382 (N.C. 1971); Hajoca Corp. v. Clayton, 178 S.E.2d 481
(N.C. 1971).
42. N.C. CONsT. art. I, § 15.
43. N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
44. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943) ("The Fourteenth
Amendment, as now applied to the States, protects the citizen against the State itself and all of
its creatures - Boards of Education not excepted."). "The history of litigation challenging racial
disparities in education suggests that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution may provide a means to contest school discipline policies."
Adira Siman, Challenging Zero Tolerance: Federal and State Legal Remedies for Students of
Color, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 327, 335 (2005) (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S.
2007]
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of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the
prevention of official conduct discriminating on the basis of race. 4 5
"Any distinction made on the basis of race in a publicly-supported
institution is a patent violation of the law, not to be tolerated by a
court that is controlled by the Constitution of the United States."4 6
To state an equal protection claim under either the federal or state
constitution, the plaintiff must allege purposeful discrimination by
school officials motivated by racial animus.47 A complaint that alleges
purposeful discrimination based on race is sufficient to withstand a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.
In Coleman v. Franklin Parish School Board,4 8 the plaintiffs sued a
public school teacher, the principal, the local school board, the school
superintendent, and the school board's insurer, alleging racial discrim-
ination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 (1976). 49 The district
court granted the defendants' 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the plaintiffs'
race discrimination claims. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit held that
plaintiffs' complaint stated a valid claim and reversed the trial court's
order of dismissal.
In this case, the plaintiffs pleaded intent and purpose to discriminate
on the part of the defendants. At this stage, we review only the suffi-
ciency of these allegations. Whether there is evidence to support the
charge, and, if so, its sufficiency may not be tested by a motion to
dismiss. The district court, therefore, improperly dismissed plaintiffs'
claim for a violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983.50
483 (1954); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Keyes v. Sch. Dist.
No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
45. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238 (1976). See also Richardson v. N.C. Dept. of
Corr., 478 S.E.2d 501, 505 (N.C. 1996) (Equal protection "requires that all persons similarly
situated be treated alike.").
46. Cypress v. Newport News Gen. & Nonsectarian Hosp. Ass'n, 375 F.2d 648, 657 (4th Cir.
1967).
47. Baldwin v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 648 F.2d 950, 954 (5th Cir.1981). "In order to
make out a claim of racial discrimination, a plaintiff 'must allege purposeful discrimination; that
is, he must assert that [defendant] took some adverse action against him as a result of a discrimi-
natory animus."' Peterkin v. Columbus County Bd. Of Educ., 486 S.E.2d 733, 734 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1997) (quoting Sterling v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 897 F. Supp. 893, 896 (E.D.Pa.
1995)).
48. Coleman v. Franklin Parish School Bd., 702 F.2d 74 (5th Cir. 1983).
49. Id. at 75-76. The complaint alleged that:
the black child was engaged in minor horseplay in the school hall with a white boy of similar
age and grade; the teacher, Bobbie Bruce, struck him on the head with a coffee cup, causing
a small cut on the black child's head; the white child was not disciplined in any way; after
school that day, the black child was taken by his mother to a doctor who sutured the cut
with two stitches.
Id. at 75.
50. Id. at 77.
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Allegations of selective prosecution of school disciplinary policies
likewise state a valid equal protection claim,5 as do allegations of ra-
cial profiling.5
In discrimination claims under § 1983, the plaintiff has the ultimate
burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defen-
dant's actions were motivated by racial animus. The plaintiff is not
required to prove that race discrimination was the sole reason for the
defendant's actions, only that discrimination was a motivating factor
in the defendant's decision to take the challenged action. 4
The plaintiff may meet this burden by resorting to "ordinary princi-
ples of proof using any direct or indirect evidence relevant to and suf-
ficiently probative of the issue."55 Although blatant acts of race
discrimination do occur, most often, discrimination is carried out in-
sidiously by persons quick to assert a ready explanation for their ac-
tions.56 Recognizing the insidious nature of race discrimination, the
Supreme Court developed an alternate method of proof for use by
plaintiffs in cases where direct evidence of discriminatory motive is
lacking. In such cases, plaintiffs may rely on the three-part burden
shifting process established by the Supreme Court in McDonnell
Douglas v. Green.57 Under this process, once a plaintiff presents evi-
51. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996). ("The decision whether to prose-
cute may not be based on 'an unjustifiable standard such as race. ). By this same token, the
decision to discipline a student may not be so based, See Alexander v. Fulton County, 207 F.3d
1303, 1336-1341 (11th Cir. 2000) (court found sufficient evidence of discrimination when two
white law enforcement officers were disciplined while their black counterparts were not disci-
plined for the same offenses); State v. Rogers, 315 S.E.2d 492, 505 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984) (selec-
tive prosecution claim not valid because "a failure to prosecute others because of a lack of
knowledge that they were subject to prosecution for the same offense as defendant does not
amount to a denial of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment." (citation omitted)).
Accord, Cohn v. New Paltz Cent. Sch. Dist., 171 Fed. Appx. 877 (2d Cir. 2006) (Suspended high
school student's complaint, alleging that punishment imposed upon him by school official was
disproportionate as compared to punishment official imposed upon two other students who en-
gaged in similar misconduct, and alleging that "[t]his disparate treatment was without any ra-
tional basis and violated plaintiff's right to equal protection of the law," stated "class of one"
equal protection claim, notwithstanding student's failure to identify actual instances where
others had been treated differently, and his failure to assert that differential treatment was
"intentional.").
52. Fennell v. Stephenson, 528 S.E.2d 911, 917-18 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000). In Fennell, the trial
court dismissed plaintiff's action alleging a pattern and practice of racially-influenced traffic
stops of Black motorists by the North Carolina Highway Patrol. The North Carolina Court of
Appeals reversed.
53. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241-43 (1976).
54. Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) ("Discriminatory purpose ...
implies that the decisionmaker ... selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in
part because of, not merely in spite of, its adverse effects upon an identifiable group." (internal
quotations, citations and footnote omitted)); Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev.,
429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977). Fuller v. Phipps, 67 F.3d 1137, 1144 (4th Cir. 1995).
55. Brinkley v. Harbour Rec. Club, 180 F.3d 598, 607 (4th Cir. 1999).
56. Id.
57. McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
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dence to satisfy the elements of the applicable prima facie case, a pre-
sumption of discriminatory motive arises.58
At the first stage of the McDonnell Douglas three-part burden shift-
ing process, the plaintiff is required only to meet the minimal standard
of demonstrating a prima facie case of discrimination.5 9 To meet this
burden, the plaintiff need only present some evidence of each element
of the prima facie case.6 ° This is not an onerous requirement 6' and
poses "a burden easily met."'62 Once a plaintiff satisfies the elements
of the applicable prima facie case, a presumption of discriminatory
motive arises.
During the initial proof stage, plaintiffs are not required to prove
discriminatory motive.63 When assessing a plaintiff's prima facie case
at the first stage of proof, the court must examine the plaintiff's evi-
dence independently and without regard to any nondiscriminatory
purpose that may be asserted by the defendant. 64 The first stage is
concerned only with the plaintiff's prima facie case. Any justification
or other evidence proffered by the defendant is not relevant at this
stage. Otherwise, the first and second stages would be collapsed into
one, contrary to the three-part process required under McDonnell
Douglas.
At the first stage, the plaintiff is not required to offer direct evi-
dence of discrimination. To the contrary, if the plaintiff presents di-
rect evidence of discrimination, the McDonnell Douglas burden-
shifting process does not apply.65 Indirect evidence of discrimination
is critical to proof of the plaintiff's prima facie case. Indirect evidence
is any evidence upon which the trier of fact could base a reasonable
inference of discriminatory motive and can take a wide variety of
58. See Gant v. Wallingford Bd. of Educ., 195 F.3d 134, 146 (2d Cir. 1999) (specifically
applying the burden-shifting analysis to school discrimination claim).
59. Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 263 (1981).
60. Id.
61. Id. See also Nichols v. Loral Vought Sys. Corp., 81 F.3d 38, 41 (5th Cir. 1996) ("[T]o
establish a prima facie case, the plaintiff need only make a very minimal showing.").
62. Wrenn v. Gould, 808 F.2d 493, 500 (6th Cir. 1987). A major purpose behind the Su-
preme Court's adoption of the three-part burden-shifting process in discrimination cases is to
help the parties and the court resolve "the disparity in access to information between" the plain-
tiff and defendant regarding the true motives behind the defendant's action. Walker v. Mortham,
158 F.3d 1177, 1192 (11th Cir. 1998). Courts should not use the first stage as a tool to dismiss
plaintiff's claims, but as a tool to help bring the parties "expeditiously and fairly to the ultimate
question." Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.
63. Cline v. Catholic Diocese, 206 F.3d 651, 655 (6th Cir. 2000).
64. EEOC v. Horizon/CMS Healthcare, 220 F.3d 1184, 1193 (10th Cir. 2000).
65. Brown v. E. Miss. Elec. Power Assoc., 989 F.2d 858, 862 (5th Cir., 1993), reh'g denied,
995 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1993). See also, Bynum v. Hobbs Realty, No. 1:00-CV-1143, 3, 2002 WL
1065866 (M.D.N.C. April 4, 2002) (plaintiffs' claim "based upon what has been deemed to con-
stitute a sufficient showing of direct evidence of discrimination, that is, the alleged racially de-
rogatory statement of [the defendant], so as to create an issue of fact without resort to the
McDonnell Douglas test.").
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forms. For example, evidence that school officials systematically disci-
plined minority students more harshly than similarly situated white
students, whether or not such evidence is rigorously statistical, would
constitute circumstantial evidence of intentional discrimination.66
In Hawkins v. Coleman,67 for example, after hearing expert wit-
nesses, the court found that black students were suspended more
often, and for longer periods, than white students, and that the major-
ity of suspensions were for minor, nonviolent offenses.68 The court
attributed this disparity to "institutional racism. ''69  "Proof of dispro-
portionate impact 'may provide an important starting point' by creat-
ing an inference of discriminatory intent and a challenge to a zero
tolerance policy would likely rely heavily on such evidence.
70
The disparate impact of zero tolerance policies can generally be shown
using data on student populations and disciplinary actions. Statistical
analyses that establish higher rates of punishment for students of color
relative to their representation in the student body and correlations
between race and the use of punishment will be particularly useful. 71
Indirect evidence of discriminatory motive may also include evi-
dence that the allegedly discriminatory action violated the defendant's
own policies,72 evidence that the plaintiff confided detailed accounts
66. Troupe v. May Dept. Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 736 (7th Cir. 1994) (employment discrimi-
nation). Statistical evidence is often used as indirect evidence in discrimination cases. Brown v.
E. Miss. Elec. Power Assoc., 989 F.2d 858, 863 (5th Cir. 1993), reh'g denied, 995 F.2d 225
(5th Cir. 1993); Patrick Pauken & Philip T.K. Daniel, Race Discrimination and Disability Dis-
crimination in School Discipline: A Legal and Statistical Analysis, 139 Ed. Law Rep. 759 (West
2000); Adira Siman, Challenging Zero Tolerance: Federal and State Legal Remedies for Students
of Color, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 327, 337 (2005) (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S.
356 (1886)). In Yick Wo, the Supreme Court invalidated a San Francisco ordinance banning the
operation of hand laundries in wooden buildings. The majority of such laundries were operated
by Chinese persons. "The Supreme Court invalidated the statute based on its discriminatory
application after finding that, while all non-Asian launderers who applied had received an ex-
emption to the statute, no Chinese applicant had received an exemption." Id. at n.86.
67. Hawkins v. Coleman, 376 F. Supp. 1330 (N.D. Tex. 1974).
68. Id. at 1337.
69. Id. at 1335. See also Siman, supra note 66, at 335. ("Despite the various alternative
justifications, a number of analyses maintain that the best explanation for the disparities is ra-
cism or racial stereotyping.").
70. Siman, supra note 66, at 338 (citing Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev., 429
U.S. 252, 266 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976)).
71. Id. (citing OPPORTUNITIES SUSPENDED supra note 9, at 9-13 (June 2000)).
72. Id. at 349 (citing Vill. of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 267). See also Briscoe v. Fred's
Dollar Store, 24 F.3d 1026, 1028 (8th Cir. 1994) (departure from the way defendant's written
policy is typically applied); Giacoletto v. Amax Zinc Co., 954 F.2d 424, 427 (7th Cir. 1992) (de-
fendant's failure follow its own procedures); Ensing v. Vulcraft Corp., 830 F. Supp. 1017 (W.D.
Mich. 1993) (defendant's failure to follow established procedures); Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr
& Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 531 (3d Cir. 1992) (defendant's failure to comply with its own
procedures); Asbury v. Brougham, 866 F.2d 1276, 1281 (10th Cir. 1989) (exceptions made to
defendant's policies for non-minorities).
13
Solari and Balshaw: Outlawed and Exiled: Zero Tolerance and Second Generation Race Di
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 2007
160 NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 29:147
to others at the time of the discrimination, 73 evidence of governmental
or agency findings or statistics related to the discrimination,74 and evi-
dence of discrimination against others besides the plaintiff.75
Before filing a complaint, plaintiff's counsel should develop strate-
gies for collecting statistical data and other information that may pro-
vide indirect evidence of discrimination. 76 When possible, counsel
should submit inquiries to federal and state civil rights agencies such
as the United States Department of Education, Office for Civil
Rights, and requests for public records under the Federal Freedom of
Information Act 77 and the North Carolina Public Records Act. 78
Sample requests and other useful information is available through the
Civil Rights Project of Harvard University.79
Statistical evidence of racially disparate disciplinary procedures or
the imposition of racially disparate disciplinary actions raises an infer-
ence of intentional discrimination and would establish a prima facie
case of race discrimination against school officials.80 Once the plain-
tiff has presented evidence to establish a prima facie case of discrimi-
nation, the process of proof moves to the second stage. In the second
stage, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged action.81 By raising a re-
73. See Carter v. Blakely, No. 1:97CV00982, 1999 WL 1937226, at *3 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 1,
1999) (incidents of sexual harassment confided to coworkers).
74. Soules v. U.S. Dep't of HUD, 967 F.2d 817, 821 (2d Cir. 1992). See also Bronson v. Bd.
of Educ. of Cincinnati, No. C-1-74-205, Amended Consent Decree (Doc. #840) (S.D. Ohio 1994)
(originally 604 F. Supp. 68 (S.D. Ohio 1984)) (Because the court found that disparities in suspen-
sion and expulsion rates had not improved since the issuance of the original consent decree, the
amended consent decree required schools, inter alia, to monitor disciplinary recommendations
by teachers and intercede when teachers are responsible for disproportionate referrals). Cf,
Tasby v. Estes, 643 F.2d 1103, 1107 (3rd Cir. 1981) (holding that plaintiffs had not made out a
prima facie case for racial discrimination, but noting "[w]e also recognize that prior judicial de-
terminations of racial discrimination in the [school district]'s student disciplinary policies and
practices make [the] statistical evidence [of disparities] more persuasive.").
75. Hunter v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 797 F.2d 1417 (7th Cir. 1986) (Prior claims by minority
public school teachers may provide a source of indirect evidence of discrimination.).
76. For example, the North Carolina State Board of Education, Department of Public In-
struction, publishes an annual study of suspensions and expulsions, broken down by school dis-
tricts. According to the Annual Study for 2004-05, published in March 2006, of the 6,347 Durham
public school students who received short-term suspensions, 5,836, or 92%, were children of
color. Of the 64 Durham students suspended long-term, 57 were children of color. OFFICE OF
CURRICULUM AND SCHOOL REFORM SERVICES AND OFFICE OF DEPUTY SUPERINTENDENT,
AGENCY OPERATIONS & MANAGEMENT, STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION/DEPARTMENT OF PUB-
LIC INSTRUCTION, 2004-05 ANNUAL STUDY OF SUSPENSIONS AND ExPuLsIONS, Appx. B (2006),
available at http://www.ncpublicschools.org/schoolimprovement/alternative/reports/.
77. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006).
78. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-6 (2006).
79. Action Kit, supra note 14.
80. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266 (To demonstrate discriminatory intent solely
through the existence of a disparate effect of a policy, there must be "a clear pattern" that is
"unexplainable on grounds other than race.").
81. Ezold, 983 F.2d at 523 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254).
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buttable presumption of discrimination, the prima facie case forces
defendants to articulate what they claim to be the true reason for the
challenged action, thereby eliminating the most common nondiscrimi-
natory reasons for the defendant's treatment of the plaintiff.12 The
purpose of the first stage is simply to force the defendant to proceed
with its case. 3
Because the ultimate burden of proof remains with the plaintiff, the
defendant's burden at the intermediate stage is a burden of produc-
tion, not a burden of proof. "The defendant need not persuade the
court that it was actually motivated by the proffered reasons."84 How-
ever, it must raise "a genuine issue of fact as to whether it discrimi-
nated against the plaintiff."85
To do this,
[T]he defendant must clearly set forth, through the introduction of ad-
missible evidence, the reasons for the plaintiff's rejection. The expla-
nation provided must be legally sufficient to justify a judgment for the
defendant. If the defendant carries this burden of production, the pre-
sumption raised by the prima facie case is rebutted, and the factual
inquiry proceeds to a new level of specificity. Placing this burden of
production on the defendant thus serves simultaneously to meet the
plaintiff's prima facie case by presenting a legitimate reason for the
action and to frame the factual issue with sufficient clarity so that the
plaintiff will have a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate pretext
86
The Supreme Court has consistently stated that to satisfy the interme-
diate stage of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting process, a de-
fendant must "produce admissible evidence which would allow the
trier of fact rationally to conclude" that the challenged action was not
motivated by discriminatory animus.87
If the defendant declines to present evidence of a legitimate pur-
pose, the plaintiff is entitled to the relief requested. 8 On the other
hand, if the defendant satisfies its burden of production, the presump-
tion of discrimination drops away and the case moves to the third
stage in the McDonnell Douglas process.89
82. Hollins v. Ati. Co., 188 F.3d 652, 659 (6th Cir. 1999).
83. EEOC v. Avery Dennison Corp., 104 F.3d 858, 861-62 (6th Cir. 1997).
84. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 248.
85. Id. at 255.
86. Ezold, 983 F.2d at 523 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255-56.) A proffered
justification based on evidence acquired by the defendant after the alleged discrimination was
not legally sufficient to justify a judgment for the defendant. McKennon v. Nashville Banner,
513 U.S. 352, 360 (1995).
87. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 257.
88. Soules v. U.S. Dept. of HUD, 967 F.2d 817, 822 (2d Cir. 1992).
89. Id.
20071
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As in any civil action, the plaintiff must be given an opportunity to
rebut evidence presented in the defendant's case-in-chief. Thus, at the
third stage, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the
defendant's proffered justification was not the true reason behind the
challenged action but was a pretext for discrimination. The plaintiff
may establish pretext directly or indirectly by persuading the trier of
fact that the defendant's actions were more likely the product of dis-
criminatory motives or that the defendant's proffered reason is un-
worthy of credence.9"
The plaintiff's evidence must persuade the trier of fact that the ex-
planation offered by the defendant was not the true reason behind the
challenged action. Although the plaintiff must demonstrate by com-
petent evidence that the defendant's proffered justification was in fact
a cover-up for a discriminatory decision,91 "explicit evidence of dis-
crimination - i.e., the 'smoking gun' - is not required."92
In saying that the presumption drops from the case, we do not imply
that the trier of fact no longer may consider evidence previously intro-
duced by the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case. A satisfactory
explanation by the defendant destroys the legally mandatory infer-
ence of discrimination arising from the plaintiff's initial evidence.
Nonetheless, this evidence and inferences properly drawn therefrom
may be considered by the trier of fact on the issue of whether the
defendant's explanation is pretextual. Indeed, there may be some
cases where the plaintiff's initial evidence, combined with effective
cross-examination of the defendant, will suffice to discredit the defen-
dant's explanation. 93
The plaintiff may be able to show that the defendant's proffered
justification is unworthy of credence when the defendant's justifica-
tion or explanation for taking the challenged action changes between
the time the action was taken and the trial.94
[I]f a plaintiff produces credible evidence that it is more likely than
not that "the [defendant] did not act for its proffered reason, then the
[defendant's] decision remains unexplained and the inferences from
90. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256.
91. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 805.
92. Ezold, 983 F.2d at 523.
93. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256 n.10.
94. See, e.g., Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools, 75 F.3d 989, 994 (5th Cir. 1996), en banc,
(explaining that an inference of discriminatory intent may exist where a defendant's proffered
reasons are false). See also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 134 (2000)
(allowing an inference of discriminatory intent where the defendant's explanation is unworthy of
credence); Goodman v. Super Star Rent-A-Car, NO. 3:96-CV-1092-R, 1997 WL 452737 at *6
(N.D. Tex. Jul 31, 1997) (upholding jury's finding that the defendant's proffered reasons were
pretext where they were inconsistent and blatantly false).
16
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 29, No. 2 [2007], Art. 2
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol29/iss2/2
2007] OUTLAWED AND EXILED
the evidence produced by the plaintiff may be sufficient to prove the
ultimate fact of discriminatory intent." 95
When the plaintiff shows that the defendant's actions were more
likely the product of a discriminatory motive rather than the defen-
dant's articulated legitimate reasons, "sufficiently strong evidence" of
defendant's past discrimination may be enough. 96 As in any civil ac-
tion, the trier of fact is entitled to draw reasonable inferences from the
evidence presented. In the context of summary judgment, the plain-
tiff, as the non-moving party, is entitled to the benefit of "every legiti-
mate inference" in her favor.97 This is especially true in race
discrimination cases, where the defendant's motive is a critical issue to
be determined. 98
Summary judgment is improper in a civil rights case whenever the
defendant's proffered justification raises a suspicion of mendacity on
the defendant's part. "[A] plaintiff should often or usually be able to
avoid summary judgment simply by presenting (a) evidence support-
ing a prima facie case, and (b) evidence tending to falsify the [defen-
dant's] proffered justification." 99 In Goodman v. Super Star Rent-A-
Car,100 an employment discrimination case, the court denied the de-
fendant's motion for summary judgment, saying:
95. Ezold, 983 F.2d at 524 (quoting Chipollini v. Spencer Gifts, 814 F.2d 893, 899 (3d Cir.
1987), en banc (stating that summary judgment is improper in a civil rights case whenever the
defendant's proffered justification raises a suspicion of mendacity on the defendant's part.). See
also Smith v. Equitrac Corp., 88 F. Supp. 2d 727, 737 (S.D. Tex. 2000); Goodman v. Super Star
Rent-A-Car, No. 3:96-CV-1092-R, 1997 WL 452737 at *6 (N.D. Tex. Jul. 31, 1997) (citing La-
Pierre v. Benson Nissan, Inc., 86 F.3d 444, 449-50 (5th Cir. 1996) (upholding jury's finding that
the defendant's proffered reasons were pretext where they were inconsistent and blatantly
false)).
96. Ezold, 983 F.2d at 523.
97. DeJarnette v. Corning, Inc., 133 F.3d 293, 300 (4th Cir. 1998) (Murnaghan, C.J., dissent-
ing) (citing Duke v. Uniroyal, Inc., 928 F.2d 1413, 1419 (4th Cir. 1991)).
98. Id. (citing Taylor v. Home Ins. Co., 777 F.2d 849, 854 (4th Cir. 1985)).
99. Smith v. Equitrac Corp., 88 F. Supp. 2d 727, 737 (S.D. Tex. 2000). In Smith, an employ-
ment discrimination case, the district court discussed the implicative power of mendacity, espe-
cially in discrimination actions. The court acknowledged that in some cases, evidence tending to
show the falsity of a defendant's proffered nondiscriminatory justification, in and of itself, will
support a reasonable inference of discriminatory motive, thereby satisfying the plaintiff's ulti-
mate burden of proof. The court specifically addressed the power of finding that a defendant's
evidence is false:
[E]vidence which rises to the level of outright mendacity has considerably more implicative
power than [false] evidence which simply suggests the defendant is mistaken, confused, or
not as credible as the plaintiff. The explanation for this increased implicative power is that a
lie is often considered evidence of the consciousness of guilt.
Id. at 741. See also Briscoe v. Fred's Dollar Store, Inc., 24 F.3d 1026, 1028 (8th Cir. 1994) (defen-
dant's justification at time of trial differed from reasons given at time of challenged action);
Estes v. Dick Smith Ford, Inc., 856 F.2d 1097, 1101 (8th Cir. 1988) (defendant's proffered justifi-
cation at trial differed from explanation originally given to plaintiff).
100. Goodman v. Super Star Rent-A-Car, NO. 3:96-CV-1092-R, 1997 WL 452737 (N.D. Tex.
Jul 31, 1997).
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Finally, the manner in which [defendant] has asserted different rea-
sons for [plaintiff's] termination during different stages of this litiga-
tion is sufficient to raise a "suspicion of mendacity." The
inconsistency of its allegations and the blatant untruthfulness of many
of the facts in [defendant's] response to the EEOC engender reasona-
ble skepticism with the Court as to all of the asserted reasons for
[plaintiff's] termination. There is no question that a reasonable jury
could find that [defendant's] reasons were pretextual. 1 1
Similarly, if the jury disbelieves the defendant's proffered justifica-
tion, it "can reasonably infer from the falsity of the explanation that
the [defendant] is dissembling to cover up a discriminatory
purpose.' 10
2
The factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant
(particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity),
may, together with the elements of a prima facie case, suffice to show
intentional discrimination. Thus, rejection of the defendant's prof-
fered reasons will permit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of
intentional discrimination. 10 3
The credibility of a defendant's proffered justification is to be assessed
based on the information available to the defendant at the time of the
challenged action. 104
The defendant's proffered justification does not have to rise to the
level of outright untruthfulness to be rejected. Because "clever men
may easily conceal their motivations," courts take a skeptical view of a
defendant's proffered justification when the justification is based on
the defendant's subjective rationales. 05 When a defendant offers its
own subjective judgment to explain an otherwise poorly documented
decision, it exposes itself to the risk that the jury will not believe the
proffered justification.106 A school official's unsubstantiated "suspi-
cion" of gang-related activity proffered as justification for suspension
or expulsion would constitute one such subjective rationale. "[A]s a
recent report on public school racial discrimination points out, schools
that retain some discretion to consider mitigating factors appear to
confer leniency when they believe that the student has future pros-
101. Id. at *6 (citing LaPierre v. Benson Nissan, Inc., 86 F.3d 444, 449-50 (5th Cir. 1996)).
102. Lane v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. Civ. CCB-99-763, 2000 WL 1481638 at *4 (D. Md.
Aug. 28, 2000) (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147 (2000)).
103. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993) quoted in Halperin v. Abacus
Tech. Corp., 128 F.3d 191, 201 n.15. (4th Cir. 1997).
104. Warren v. Fort Lincoln Cemetery, Inc., No. Civ. A. AW-00-419, 2001 WL 743199 at *7
(D. Md. June 26, 2001).
105. Soules v. U.S. Dep't of HUD, 967 F.2d 817, 822 (2d Cir. 1992) (quoting United States v.
City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1185 (8th Cir. 1974)).
106. Giacoletto v. Amax Zinc Co., 954 F.2d 424, 427 (7th Cir. 1992).
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pects that would be destroyed by expulsion, and such calculations are
easily influenced by racial stereotypes.' 10 7
B. Due Process
That [schools] are educating the young for citizenship is reason for
scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if
we are not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to
discount important principles of our government as mere platitudes.10 8
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment declares it
is unlawful for a state actor to "deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law .... " Echoing the Fourteenth
Amendment guarantee of due process, the Law of the Land provision
of the North Carolina Constitution provides, "No person shall be...
outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner deprived of his life, liberty, or
property, but by the law of the land."' 9 The North Carolina "courts
have long held that "[t]he 'law of the land' clause has the same mean-
ing as 'due process of law' under the Federal Constitution.""' Both
provisions reflect a centuries-old, fundamental principal of law that
the honor, integrity, and reputation of private citizens should be pro-
tected from arbitrary injury by government officials.11" ' As outlined
in Corum v. University of North Carolina Through the Board of
Governors,
It is the state judiciary that has the responsibility to protect the state
constitutional rights of the citizens; this obligation to protect the fun-
damental rights of individuals is as old as the State .... We give our
Constitution a liberal interpretation in favor of its citizens with respect
to those provisions which were designed to safeguard the liberty and
security of the citizens in regard to both person and property." 2
This right to due process is extended to the public school system.
"[Y]oung people do not 'shed their constitutional rights' at the school-
107. Eric Blumenson and Eva S. Nilsen, One Strike and You're Out? Constitutional Con-
straints on Zero Tolerance in Public Education, 81 WASH. U.L.Q. 65, 85 (2003) (citing Applied
Research Center, Facing the Consequences: An Examination of Racial Discrimination in U.S.
Public Schools, (Mar. 2000), at 6, available at http://www.arc.org/erase/FTC2zero.html.
108. W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943). See also Ambach v. Norwick,
441 U.S. 68, 76 (1979) (describing schools as the primary vehicle for transmitting "the values on
which our society rests").
109. N.C. CoNsT., art. I, § 19.
110. State v. Guice, 541 S.E.2d 474, 480 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000) (quoting Sumney Outdoor
Adver., Inc. v. County of Henderson, 386 S.E.2d 439, 444 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989)).
111. The Magna Carta of 1297 provided, "No Freeman shall be ... outlawed, or exiled, or
any otherwise destroyed; nor will we pass upon him, nor condemn him, but by... the Law of the
Land." (Confirmation of the Charters Act, 1297, 25 Edw. I, c. 29, (Eng.)), http://www.answers.
com/topic/list-of-acts-of-parliament-of-the-english-parliament-to-1600-1 and http://www.
archives.gov/exhibits/featured documents/magnacarta/.
112. Corum v. Univ. of N.C. Through Bd. of Governors, 413 S.E.2d 276, 290 (N.C. 1992)
(citations omitted).
2007]
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house door.""' 3 In West Virginia State Board of Education v. Bar-
nette,1 4 the Supreme Court held, "The Fourteenth Amendment, as
now applied to the States, protects the citizen against the State itself
and all of its creatures Boards of Education not excepted." '15 "These
[Boards of Education] have ... important, delicate and highly discre-
tionary functions, but none that they may not perform within the lim-
its of the Bill of Rights.""' 6 A public school student who is suspended
or expelled without due process is deprived of both property and lib-
erty in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and Article I, section19.117
1. Education as Property Interest
The North Carolina Constitution guarantees to all North Carolina
children, a fundamental right of an equal opportunity to receive a
public school education."' "It is clear ... that equal access to partici-
pation in our public school system is a fundamental right, guaranteed
by our state constitution and protected by considerations of procedu-
ral due process."' 1 9 That right may not be withdrawn on grounds of
misconduct absent fundamentally fair due process procedures to de-
termine whether the misconduct has occurred. 2 °
The authority possessed by the State to prescribe and enforce stan-
dards of conduct in its schools, although concededly very broad, must
be exercised consistently with constitutional safeguards. Among other
things, the State is constrained to recognize a student's legitimate enti-
tlement to a public education as a property interest which is protected
by the Due Process Clause and which may not be taken away for mis-
conduct without adherence to the minimum procedures required by
that Clause.'2'
113. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975) (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Dist., 393
U.S. 503, 506 (1969)).
114. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. See, e.g., Goss, 419 U.S. at 576 ("Neither the property interest in educational benefits
temporarily denied nor the liberty interest in reputation, which is also implicated, is so insub-
stantial that suspensions may constitutionally be imposed by any procedure the school chooses,
no matter how arbitrary."); James M. Peden, Through a Glass Darkly: Educating with Zero Tol-
erance, 10 KAN. J.L. . & PUB. POL'Y 369, 377 (2001) ("The authority possessed by the State to
proscribe and enforce standards of conduct in its schools, although admittedly very broad, must
be exercised in a manner consistent with the Constitution.").
118. Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 255-56 (N.C. 1997) (applying N.C. CONST. art. I, § 15,
art. IX, § 2(1)).
119. Sneed v. Greensboro City Bd. of Ed., 264 S.E.2d 106, 113 (N.C. 1980) (citing U.S.
CONsT., amend. XIV; N.C. CONST., art. I, § 19; Givens v. Poe, 346 F. Supp. 202 (W.D.N.C.
1972)).
120. See Goss, 419 U.S. at 574.
121. Id.
20
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The Supreme Court's view has long been that "as long as a property
deprivation is not de minimis, its gravity is irrelevant to the question
whether account must be taken of the Due Process Clause. 1 112 2 In
Goss v. Lopez, the Court concluded that a ten-day suspension from
school is not de minimis and may not be imposed absent minimal due
process procedures. 2 3
A short suspension is, of course, a far milder deprivation than expul-
sion. But, "education is perhaps the most important function of state
and local governments," and the total exclusion from the educational
process for more than a trivial period, and certainly if the suspension
is for 10 days, is a serious event in the life of the suspended child.'2 4
"[Children have] a strong interest in [the] procedural safeguards
that minimize the risk of wrongful punishment .... ,,121 By failing to
adhere to fundamental principals of due process, school officials "can
well break the spirits of the expelled students and of others familiar
with the injustice, and do inestimable harm to their education.' ' 26
When a public school student faces suspension for ten days or more,
due process requires, at a minimum, the following essential
procedures:
(1) notice to parents and student in the form of a written and specific
statement of the charges which, if proved, would justify the punish-
ment sought; (2) a full hearing after adequate notice and (3) con-
ducted by an impartial tribunal; (4) the right to examine exhibits and
other evidence against the student; (5) the right to be represented by
counsel (though not at public expense); (6) the right to confront and
examine adverse witnesses; (7) the right to present evidence on behalf
of the student; (8) the right to make a record of the proceedings; and
(9) the requirement that the decision of the authorities be based upon
substantial evidence. 127
122. Id. at 576 (citing Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 342 (1969); Boddie v.
Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378-79 (1971); Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 n.8 (1972)).
123. See id. At least one district court has held that a student's constitutionally protected
property interest in education is also implicated by removal from regular classes and placement
in an alternative education program and that, in such cases, the student is entitled to due process
prior to such removal and reassignment. Nevares v. San Marcos Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 954 F.
Supp. 1162, 1166-67 (W.D. Tex. 1996) rev'd on other grounds, 111 F.3d 25 (5th Cir. 1997).
124. Id. (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)).
125. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 676 (1977).
126. Dixon v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 157 (5th Cir. 1961).
127. Givens v. Poe, 346 F. Supp. 202, 209 (W.D.N.C. 1972). These same requirements are
found in many disciplinary policies adopted by local school boards. See, e.g., Durham Public
School Policy 4303.4, governing the procedures for long-term suspensions. The Durham policy
includes six of the eight "essential" procedures identified in Givens. It does not require that the
hearing be "conducted by an impartial tribunal" or that the decision "be based upon substantial
evidence." DURHAM PUB. SCH. CODE OF STUDENT CONDUCT POLICY 4303.4, Suspension and
Expulsion (1999), available at http://www.dpsnc.net/index.php?option=comkb&Itemid=l&
page=articles&articleid=132.
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Due process also requires school officials to warn students that cer-
tain types of behavior can result in long-term suspension or expul-
sion. Whenever discipline may result in expulsion or long-term
suspension, the student and his or her parent must be informed of
specific charges and grounds for expulsion.1 29 A hearing must be held
before a student is formally expelled,1 30 and the charges against the
student must be supported by substantial evidence. 31
2. Reputation as Liberty Interest
The United States Supreme Court has held that public school stu-
dents have a protectable liberty interest in their good name and repu-
tation and that school officials must afford due process to students
suspended from school based on charges of misconduct. 132
If sustained and recorded, those charges could seriously damage the
students' standing with their fellow pupils and their teachers as well as
interfere with later opportunities for higher education and employ-
ment. It is apparent that the claimed right of the State to determine
unilaterally and without process whether that misconduct has oc-
curred immediately collides with the requirements of the
Constitution.1
33
128. Roni R. Reed, Education and the State Constitutions: Alternatives for Suspended and
Expelled Students, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 582, 584 (1996) (citing LAWRENCE F. Rossow, THE LAW
OF STUDENT ExPuLsIONS AND SUSPENSIONS 3 (Education Law Association 2nd ed. 1989). This
policy is embedded in the North Carolina General Statutes:
Local boards of education shall adopt policies not inconsistent with the provisions of the
Constitutions of the United States and North Carolina, governing the conduct of students
and establishing procedures to be followed by school officials in suspending or expelling any
student, or in disciplining any student if the offensive behavior could result in suspension,
expulsion, or the administration of corporal punishment.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-391(a) (2006).
129. Rossow, supra note 128 (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972); Ep-
person v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968); Dixon v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.
1961)). In this regard, due process violations may arise when school officials suspend or expel a
student based on misconduct for which the student was not formally charged. Durham Public
School Policy 4303.4(A), for example, requires:
In any case in which the principal recommends a student for a suspension of more than 10
school days, he/she shall provide notice of the suspension to the student's parent/guardian
and to the Superintendent. The notice must state the dates for which the suspension is pro-
posed, and provide notice of the alleged conduct and the rule it violates.
Subsection (C)(6) of the same policy provides that the hearing panel "shall determine whether
the student violated the code of conduct." It does not require a determination that the student's
conduct violated the specific rule under which the student was charged, thus setting the stage for
this type due process violation. DURHAM PUB. SCH. CODE OF STUDENT CONDUCT POLICY
4303.4(A), Suspension and Expulsion (1999), available at http://www.dpsnc.net/index.phpop-
tion=comkb&Itemid=l&page=articles&articleid=132.
130. Id. at 7-8.
131. Id. at 21 (citing Birdsey v. Grand Blanc Cmty. Sch., 344 N.W.2d 342 (Mich. Ct. App.
1983)).
132. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 576 (1975).
133. Id.
22
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The guarantee of due process is "intended to prevent government
officials 'from abusing [their] power, or employing it as an instrument
of oppression.'"1 34 Whenever government officials assign to someone
a label or characterization that may be a stigma or badge of disgrace,
due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard.135
In Wisconsin v. Constantineau,'36 the chief of police, acting under
authority of a Wisconsin statute, posted notices in every liquor store in
town that, because the plaintiff drank to excess, all persons were for-
bidden, under punishment of law, from selling or giving alcoholic bev-
erages to the plaintiff for a period of one year. The plaintiff sued
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking damages and injunctive relief for vio-
lation of her Fourteenth Amendment right of due process. The Court
held the Wisconsin statute unconstitutional on its face and enjoined its
enforcement:
It would be naive not to recognize that such "posting" or characteriza-
tion of an individual will expose him to public embarrassment and rid-
icule, and it is our opinion that procedural due process requires that
before one acting pursuant to State statute can make such a quasi-
judicial determination, the individual involved must be given notice of
the intent to post and an opportunity to present his side of the
matter.
137
The North Carolina court reached a similar conclusion in Toomer v.
Garrett.138 In Toomer, a State employee sued her employer for viola-
tion of due process, alleging that he made false charges against her
without notice and without allowing her opportunity to be heard. The
North Carolina Court of Appeals expressly acknowledged that a right
of due process arises whenever governmental action causes damage to
a citizen's reputation. 139 To establish a due process violation based on
false charges by a government employer, a plaintiff must sufficiently
allege four elements:
that the charges made by Defendants were false; 2) that the charges
were made public; 3) that the charges were made in the course of dis-
charge or serious demotion; and 4) that the "charges against [her]...
'might seriously damage [her] standing and associations in [her] com-
munity' or otherwise 'impose on [her] a stigma or other disability that
foreclosed [her] freedom to take advantage of other employment
opportunities.' "14 o
134. Dobrowolska v. Wall, 530 S.E.2d 590, 599 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000) (quoting Collins v.
Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 126 (1992)).
135. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 436 (1971).
136. Id. at 436.
137. Id. (quoting Constantineau v. Grager, 302 F. Supp. 861, 864 (E.D. Wis. 1969)).
138. Toomer v. Garrett, 574 S.E.2d 76 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002).
139. Id. at 87.
140. Id. (quoting Shelton Riek v. Story, 75 F. Supp. 2d 480, 487 (M.D.N.C. 1999)) (internal
citations omitted).
2007]
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Although Toomer was decided in the context of State employment,
the same right of due process arises whenever "government officials
assign to someone a label or characterization that may be a stigma or
badge of disgrace." '' "Only when the whole proceedings leading to
the pinning of an unsavory label on a person are aired can oppressive
results be prevented. '" 1
42
"It goes without saying, and needs no elaboration, that a record of
expulsion from high school constitutes a lifetime stigma.' 1 43 When
school officials suspend or expel a student based on suspicion of gang-
related activities, the harm to the student's reputation can be devastat-
ing.144 A reputation as a gang-member is a badge of disgrace that is
all but certain to seriously impair a student's future educational and
employment opportunities. Before public school students are assigned
such a label and robbed of their good name and reputation, due pro-
cess requires they be afforded notice and an opportunity to be heard.
3. Outlawed and Exiled
Reflecting a fundamental principal of law dating back to the Magna
Carta, the North Carolina State Constitution Law of the Land provi-
sion directs that, "[n]o person shall be .. .outlawed, or exiled, or in
any manner deprived of his life, liberty, or property, but by the law of
the land. ' 145 A public school student accused by school officials of
gang membership and suspended or expelled from school with no no-
tice or opportunity to be heard is, in every sense, "outlawed" and "ex-
iled" without due process of law in violation of Article I, section 19.
Many, if not most, school disciplinary policies define a "gang" as
"any ongoing organization, association, or group of three or more per-
sons, whether formal or informal, having as one of its primary activi-
ties the commission of criminal acts. ' 146  Without regard for the
devastation caused by their actions and, more often than not, based on
little more than supposition, school officials routinely brand minority
141. Constantineau, 400 U.S. at 435.
142. Id. at 437.
143. Vought v. Van Buren Pub. Sch., 306 F. Supp. 1388, 1393 (E.D. Mich. 1969).
144. For example, Durham Public School Policy 4301.10 defines a "gang" as "any ongoing
organization, association, or group of three or more persons, whether formal or informal, having
as one of its primary activities the commission of criminal acts." DURHAM PUB. SCH. CODE OF
STUDENT CONDUCT POLICY 4301.10, RULE 10 (2006), available at http://www.dpsnc.net/index.
php?option=com-kb&Itemid=1&page=articles&articleid=129.
145. N.C. CONST., art. I, § 19 (emphasis added).
146. See source cited supra note 144. Wake County defines a "gang" as "any ongoing organi-
zation, association, or group of three or more persons, whether formal or informal, having as one
of its primary activities the commission of criminal acts, or the purposeful violation of any
WCPSS policy, and having a common name or common identifying sign, colors or symbols."
WAKE COUNTY BD. OF EDUC. BD. POLICY 6424, available at http://www.wcpss.net/policy-files/
series/policies/6424-bp.html.
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students "gang-affiliated" without affording them any process at all.
"In the name of school safety, schools have implemented unforgiving,
overly harsh zero tolerance discipline practices that turn kids into
criminals for acts that rarely constitute a crime when committed by an
adult.'
' 4 7
Educational think tanks such as the Justice Policy Institute and the
Children's Law Center agree that "one of the most harmful effects of
zero tolerance policies is the criminalization of minors for behavior
that was once handled by school administrators. ' 148 With no opportu-
nity to defend themselves, minority students are slaves to the caprice
of school officials. Suspicion of "gang-affiliation" almost always re-
sults in expulsion or long-term suspension of minority students. These
students are not only denied a meaningful public school education,
they are exiled from their community of peers.149 They are "out-
lawed" and "exiled" within the plain meaning of Article I, section 19.
While neither term has been subject to judicial interpretation for
some thirty years, the terms "outlawed" and "exiled" are in common
usage and have a well-recognized, plain meaning.150 When the lan-
guage of a constitutional provision is clear, courts must give the provi-
sion its plain meaning.' 51 Further interpretation or construction is not
only unnecessary but improper.
147. Advancement Project, Education on Lockdown: The Schoolhouse to Jailhouse Track 11
(March 2005), [hereinafter Education on Lockdown], http://www.advancementproject.org/re-
ports/FINALEOLrep.pdf.
148. Alicia C. Insley, Suspending and Expelling Children from Educational Opportunity:
Time to Reevaluate Zero Tolerance Policies, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1039, 1070-71 (2001).
149. "Expel" is a commonly recognized synonym for "exile," and vice versa. ROGET'S II THE
NEW THESAURUS 360, 362 (Joseph P. Pickett et al. eds., Houghton Mifflin, 3rd ed. 2003).
"Across the United States many public schools have turned into feeder schools for the juvenile
and criminal justice systems. Youths are finding themselves increasingly at risk of falling into the
school-to-prison pipeline through push-outs (systematic exclusion through suspensions, expul-
sions, discouragement, and high-stakes testing)." Education on Lockdown, supra note 147, at 11.
"The negative and harmful psychological effects on school children of zero tolerance policies
may also occur when a student is separated from the general student population by expulsion,
not for violation of the law, but for a misapplied application of a policy." Hanson, supra note 3,
at 327. See also Michael F. Armstrong, Banishment: Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 111 U. PA.
L. REV. 758, 758 (1963) (citation omitted) ("The device of thrusting out of the group those who
have broken its code is very ancient and constitutes the most fearful fate which primitive law
could inflict. The offender ... was driven forth naked into the wild.").
150. As a noun, the word "outlaw" means a fugitive from the law; a habitual criminal; a
rebel; a nonconformist; or a person excluded from normal legal protection and rights. AMERI-
CAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1249 (Joseph P. Pickett et. al. eds.,
Houghton Mifflin, 4th ed. 2000). As a verb, it means "to declare illegal; to place under a ban; to
prohibit; or to deprive one of the protection of the law." Id. As a noun, "exile" is commonly
defined as an unwilling absence from a home country, or place of residence, banishment, or
official expulsion from a home, country, or area. As a verb, "exile" means to banish, to order
someone to leave and stay away from a home, country or place. MSN Encarta, available at http:/
/www.encarta.msn.com/dictionary_/exile.html (2006).
151. Phillip Morris USA, Inc. v. Tolson, 626 S.E.2d 853, 856-57 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006).
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At one time, the term "outlawed" appeared in the North Carolina
Outlawry Statute, former section 15-48. Under that statute, judges and
magistrates were authorized to issue proclamations declaring accused
felons fugitives from the law.'52 The statute also provided that, if an
accused felon failed to surrender, "any citizen of the State may cap-
ture, arrest, and bring him to justice, and in case of flight or resistance
by him, after being called on and warned to surrender, may slay him
without accusation of any crime. '153
In 1976, the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of North
Carolina declared the Outlawry Statute void as procedurally deficient
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and un-
constitutionally capricious and irrational under the Equal Protection
Clause. 54 The statute was repealed the following year and super-
seded by the North Carolina Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, codi-
fied at N.C. Gen. Stat. section 15A-721, et seq. The term "outlaw"
does not appear in the Uniform Act. The term "outlawed," within the
meaning of Article I, section 19, cannot be interpreted by reference to
the Outlawry Statute.
Likewise, the term "exiled" cannot be construed as an order of ban-
ishment, compelling an individual to leave the State. With or without
due process, such an order is void. In State v. Doughtie,155 after sen-
tencing a defendant to two years on the road, the trial court sus-
pended the sentence on condition the defendant leave the State of
North Carolina and not return for two years.' 56 The North Carolina
Supreme Court reversed on grounds that the trial court's order was
"in all practical effect a sentence of banishment or exile for two
years.' 57 The court held that no North Carolina court has the power
to pass a sentence of banishment, and if it does so, the sentence is
void. 58 In doing so, the court acknowledged:
In many cases this court has sustained the suspension of sentences on
condition that the defendant remain for a fixed period of time of good
behaviour [sic], pay a certain sum of money, etc.; conditions which
were favorable to the defendant, permitting him if he obeyed the con-
ditions to avoid serving the sentence, and in furtherance of sound pub-
lic policy.159
152. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-48 (repealed 1977).
153. Id.
154. Autry v. Mitchell, 420 F. Supp. 967, 970-72 (E.D.N.C. 1976).
155. State v. Doughtie, 74 S.E.2d 922 (N.C. 1953).
156. Id. at 924.
157. Id.
158. Id. See also, State v. Culp, 226 S.E.2d 841(N.C. Ct. App 1976) (sentence of two years
suspended on condition that defendant remove his trailer to some other location in the county is,
in practical effect, a sentence of banishment for two years and therefore void).
159. Id.
26
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 29, No. 2 [2007], Art. 2
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol29/iss2/2
OUTLAWED AND EXILED
The court's reasoning in Doughtie applies with equal force to expul-
sion and long-term suspensions of public school students, which often
"represent a lost moment to teach children about respect, and a
missed chance to inspire their trust in authority figures. ' 160 Students
may act out at school for any number of reasons, including stress in-
duced by family members or home situations. Such a student "could
benefit from interventions to get on track in her education, but is ex-
cluded from the very institution that could and should offer help." '161
There is no more certain way in which to make young people in
whom rest the seeds of potential less likely to succeed than to rob
them of their basic rights, place on them the stigma of the gang mem-
bership, and banish them to the perpetual pall of criminality. Per-
fectly obvious is that outlawing and exiling our public school students
is the very antithesis of education.
The Constitution is a living instrument. All of its words have mean-
ing.162 "It is proper to assume that a constitution is intended to meet
and to be applied to new conditions and circumstances as they may
arise in the course of the progress of the community. 1 63  Public
school students who are publicly accused of gang membership and ex-
pelled or suspended long term are, in every sense, "outlawed" and
"exiled." If these words, as used in the North Carolina Constitution
Law of the Land, are to have any meaning at all, no other construction
is possible.
4. Void for Vagueness
Essential to the notion of constitutional due process is the require-
ment that a law or regulation must provide adequate notice of the
conduct prohibited and must offer clear guidance for those who en-
force it.16 4 To survive a constitutional challenge based on vagueness, a
disciplinary policy must be written with "sufficient definiteness that
160. OPPORTUNITIES SUSPENDED, supra note 9, at 12 (citing Dirk Johnson, Schools' New
Watchword: Zero Tolerance, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1999, at Al).
161. Hanson, supra note 3, at 327 (citing Gail Morrison, Editorial, 'Zero Tolerance' Policies
Becoming Sticky Webs, 93106 THE FAC. & STAFF NEWSPAPER, VOL. 13, NO. 17, (Santa Barbara,
Cal.), May 12, 2003, available at http://www.instadv.ucsb.edu/93106/2003/May12/zero.html (Mor-
rison, a school psychologist, asserts that many students who are not aggressive or violent are
getting stuck in the zero tolerance web.).
162. State v. Emery, 31 S.E.2d 858, 866 (N.C. 1944) (Rules of construction are "intended to
make of the constitution a living thing, prospective in its application, applicable to the needs of
humanity and the changed conditions of society where it is possible for the provisions to be so
construed.").
163. Id.
164. Stephenson v. Davenport Cmty. Sch. Dist., 110 F.3d 1303, 1308 (8th Cir. 1997). See also
Jesse Christopher Cheng, Gang-Specific Policies and Regulations in the K-12 Educational Con-
text, 2 WHITTIER J. OF CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 55, 64 (2003) (discussing the dual conditions
necessary to survive a constitutional challenge based on vagueness).
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ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited" and must
define the conduct prohibited "in a manner that does not encourage
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." '65 A school disciplinary
policy that fails in either respect is subject to challenge as unconstitu-
tionally vague.
In short, a regulation is void-for-vagueness if it "forbids or requires
the doing of an act in terms so vague that [persons] of common intelli-
gence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its applica-
tion .... ." Second, the void-for-vagueness doctrine prevents arbitrary
and discriminatory enforcement.166
In Stephenson v. Davenport Community School District, a high
school student challenged the school district's gang policy as void for
vagueness. The challenged policy stated, "Gang related activities such
as display of 'colors', symbols, signals, signs, etc., will not be tolerated
on school grounds. Students in violation will be suspended from
school and/or recommended to the Board for expulsion."'1 67 The stu-
dent, who had a small cross tattooed between her thumb and index
finger, was suspended from school after school officials determined
her tattoo was a "gang symbol."' 68 She filed suit under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 against the school district, the school board, and two school
officials in their individual capacity based on violations of procedural
due process. The district court entered summary judgment for the
school defendants, and the student appealed.
The Eighth Circuit began by noting that to "a significant portion of
the world's population," a cross is viewed "as a representation of their
Christian religious faith," and that, as drafted, the list of "prohibited"
materials included many other potential religious symbols.'69 "Ac-
cordingly, while a lesser standard of scrutiny is appropriate because of
the public school setting, a proportionately greater level of scrutiny is
required because the regulation reaches the exercise of free
speech.'17
0
Relying in part on the Supreme Court's 1939 decision in Lanzetta v.
New Jersey,1 7 1 the court concluded that, without more, the term
165. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983).
166. Stephenson, 110 F.3d at 1308 (quoting Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391
(1926)).
167. Id. at 1308.
168. Id.
169. Id. (citing City of Harvard v. Gaut, 660 N.E.2d 259, 261 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (officers
testified at hearing that "the six-pointed star is a symbol of Judaism as well as of the gangs
affiliated with the Folk Nation")).
170. Id. at 1309 (citing Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 686 (1986) ("Given the
school's need to be able to impose disciplinary sanctions for a wide range of unanticipated con-
duct disruptive of the educational process, the school disciplinary rules need not be as detailed as
a criminal code which imposes criminal sanctions.")).
171. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939).
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"gang," as used in the district policy, failed "to provide adequate no-
tice of the prohibited conduct" and was therefore fatally vague.' 72
The statute at issue in Lanzetta provided:
Any person not engaged in any lawful occupation, known to be a
member of any gang consisting of two or more persons, who has been
convicted at least three times of being a disorderly person, or who has
been convicted of any crime, in this or in any other State, is declared
to be a gangster.
173
Noting the numerous and varied meanings of the term "gang"
found in dictionaries and in historical and sociological writings,174 the
Court concluded that terms the statute "employs to indicate what it
purports to denounce are so vague, indefinite, and uncertain that it
must be condemned as repugnant to the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 1 75 The Eighth Circuit found that, "The pas-
sage of nearly fifty years since Lanzetta has only added to the multiple
meanings of 'gangs.' Experts studying gangs agree with the Supreme
Court and consider the term 'gang' 'notoriously imprecise.' , 176
"[T]he failure to define the pivotal term of a regulation can render
it fatally vague. ' 177 Since "gang" was the pivotal term in the chal-
lenged regulation, yet was undefined, 78 the court concluded that, "[a]
person of common intelligence must necessarily guess at the unde-
172. Stephenson, 110 F.3d at 1310.
173. Lanzetta, 306 U.S. at 452.
174. Id. at 453-54.
175. Id. at 458. Accord, Jesse Christopher Cheng, Gang-Specific Policies and Regulations in
the K-12 Educational Context, 2 WHITTIER J. OF CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 55 (2003).
The majority of the vagueness claims . . . entail, in some form or another, alleged uncer-
tainty about what comprises a "gang." The inconsistencies among these opinions reflect
disagreement within and between communities of social scientists, law enforcement offi-
cials, and citizens about how to conceive of gangs. Although courts are primarily concerned
with the formal statutory context, problems arise when official policies adopt widely-dis-
puted, common parlance notions of "gangs" without saying more.
Id. at 65-66.
176. Stephenson, 110 F.3d at 1310 (citing Sco-rr CUMMINGS & DANIEL J. MONTI, GANGS-
THE ORIGINS AND IMPACT OF CONTEMPORARY YOUTH GANGS IN THE UNITED STATES (Albany:
State University of New York Press 1993); ROBERT K. JACKSON & WESLEY D. MCBRIDE, UN-
DERSTANDING STREET GANGS 20 (Placerville, Calif: Copperhouse Pub. Co. 1992) (meaning of
"gang activity" is "as varied as the background and perspectives of those attempting to define
it")). Cf. Gaut, 660 N.E.2d at 263 ("The subject matter of the law's prohibitions is not merely
broad, but open-ended and potentially limitless. The ordinance does not define, list, or explain
what constitutes a 'gang symbol' or 'gang colors'; it does not even define 'gang.').
177. Stephenson, 110 F.3d at 1310. (citing Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Webster, 968 F.2d
684, 690 (8th Cir. 1992) (criminal statute lacked "narrowly drawn, reasonable and definite stan-
dard" identifying the conduct restricted void-for-vagueness) (quoting Interstate Circuit, Inc. v.
City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 690 (1968))). See also Rios v. Lane, 812 F.2d 1032, 1038 (7th Cir.
1987) (prison regulation prohibiting "engaging or pressuring others to engage in gang activities
or meetings, displaying, wearing or using gang insignia, or giving gang signals" void for
vagueness).
178. Stephenson, 110 F.3d at 1310.
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fined meaning of 'gang related activities,"' and declared the regula-
tion "void-for-vagueness.,
179
A regulation may be rendered void-for-vagueness if it violates the
"well-recognized principle of language construction that it is inappro-
priate to define a word by using that same word in the definition.""18
In Chalifoux v. New Caney Independent School District,81 the district
court declared unconstitutional a regulation that defined "gang-re-
lated apparel" as "[a]ny attire which identifies students as a group
(gang-related)." '182 Tautological definitions, such as "gang-related ap-
parel" is "attire which is 'gang-related,"' are patently ambiguous and
unconstitutional.
A regulation must also define the conduct prohibited "in a manner
that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." '183
A school disciplinary policy or regulation that "allows school adminis-
trators and local police unfettered discretion to decide what repre-
sents a gang symbol" is void.' 8 4 "[A] central purpose of the vagueness
doctrine [is] that 'if arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be
prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply
them.'"t5 Discretion cannot be absolute. Without specifically stated
and enforced criteria for its exercise, discretion is absolute and "'is
authorization of arbitrariness.' 1 86
In Smith v. Goguen, the Supreme Court emphasized the importance
of defining prohibited conduct with specificity. 87 The statute before
the Court attached criminal liability to anyone "who treats contemp-
tuously the flag of the United States." The Court held the statute
facially void-for-vagueness because it set forth a standard so indefinite
that police and juries were free to act based on little more than their
own views about how the flag should be treated. 188
"[G]ang symbols, as with display of the flag, take many forms and
are constantly changing." '89 Accordingly, a school district must "'de-
179. Id. at 1311; Paul D. Murphy, Restricting Gang Clothing in Public Schools: Does a Dress
Code Violate a Student's Right of Free Expression?, 64 S. CAL. REv. 1321, 1328 (1991).
180. Chalifoux v. New Caney Indep. Sch. Dist., 976 F. Supp. 659 (S.D. Tex. 1997).
181. Id.
182. Id. at 664.
183. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983).
184. Stephenson, 110 F.3d at 1310.
185. Id. at 1311 (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972)).
186. Dobrowolska v. Wall, 530 S.E.2d 590, 601 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000) (quoting Brown v. Al-
len, 344 U.S. 443, 496 (1953)).
187. Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974), cited in Stephenson, 110 F.3d at 1310.
188. Id. at 568-69. "[B]ecause display of the flag is so common and takes so many forms,
changing from one generation to another and often difficult to distinguish in principle, a legisla-
ture should define with some care the flag behavior it intends to outlaw." Id. at 581.
189. Stephenson, 110 F.3d at 1310 (citing ROBERT K. JACKSON & WESLEY D. MCBRIDE, UN-
DERSTANDING STREET GANGS 76-77 (Placerville, Calif: Copperhouse Pub. Co. 1992)).
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fine with some care' the 'gang related activities' it wishes students to
avoid" 9 ' or risk arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of its poli-
cies. "The degree of constitutional vagueness depends partially on the
nature of the enactment." 19' A school policy under which suspensions
and expulsions are decided "solely on the basis of the subjective opin-
ion of school administrators and local police" cannot withstand consti-
tutional scrutiny. 19 2 This is especially true in states like North
Carolina, where students are constitutionally guaranteed a fundamen-
tal right to receive an equal educational opportunity.' 93
While "'there are limitations in the English language with respect to
being both specific and manageably brief,' [t]he gang problem, al-
though complex, does not present such difficulties." '94 Ironically, the
court in Stephenson found "evidence that a more precise definition of
'gang related activities' can be crafted" in the school district's
amended gang regulation.'95 In Stephenson, the school district's
amended gang policy adopted the definitions of "criminal street
gangs" set out in Iowa Code section 723A.1. The district's amended
policy defined a "gang" as
any ongoing organization, association, or group of three or more per-
sons, whether formal or informal, having as one of its primary activi-
ties the commission of one or more criminal acts, which has an
identifiable name or identifying sign or symbol, and whose members
individually or collectively engage in or have engaged in a pattern of
criminal gang activity.
The amended policy defined "pattern of gang activity" as "the com-
mission, attempt to commit, conspiring to commit, or solicitation of
two or more criminal acts, provided the criminal acts were committed
on separate dates or by two or more persons who are members of, or
belong to, the same criminal street gang."
Examples of constitutionally sound gang policies are readily availa-
ble, yet many local school boards are unwilling to amend poorly
drafted gang policies, no matter how constitutionally infirm. Under
Durham Public School Policy 4301.10, for example, a student may be
suspended for indeterminate period or even expelled for committing
190. Id.
191. Id. at 1308 (citing Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Webster, 968 F.2d 684, 689 (8th Cir.
1992)).
192. Stephenson, 110 F.3d at 1311. "[Tlhe law does not permit the enjoyment of one's prop-
erty to depend upon the arbitrary or despotic will of officials." Bizzell v. Goldsboro, 135 S.E. 50,
55 (N.C. 1926).
193. See, e.g., Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 255-56 (N.C. 1997) (applying N.C. CONST.
art. I, § 15, art. IX, § 2(1)).
194. Stephenson, 110 F.3d at 1311, n.6 (quoting U.S. Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Nat'l Ass'n. of
Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 578-79 (1973)).
195. Id.
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"any act which furthers gangs or gang-related activities. 1 96 The pol-
icy defines a "gang" as "any ongoing organization, association, or
group of three or more persons, whether formal or informal, having as
one of its primary activities the commission of criminal acts and hav-
ing a common name or common identifying sign, colors, or
symbols. "197
While this language is virtually identical to language found in the
amended policy quoted with approval in Stephenson, the Durham pol-
icy falls short of a precise definition of the conduct prohibited. Unlike
the policy in Stephenson, the Durham definition requires criminal ac-
tivity of the "group," but not that its "members individually or collec-
tively engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang
activity." The Durham policy subjects a student to suspension for
committing "any act which furthers gangs or gang-related activities,"
regardless of whether the student knowingly engaged in "gang-related
activities." As the Stephenson court observed, "a male student walk-
ing the halls of a [Durham] school with untied shoelaces, a Duke Uni-
versity baseball cap and a cross earring potentially violates the
[Durham gang policy] in four ways. "198
The Durham policy also prohibits the "[w]earing, possessing, using,
distributing, displaying, or selling any clothing, jewelry, emblems,
badges, symbols, signs or other items which may be evidence of mem-
bership or affiliation in any gang." 199 This provision grants unfettered
discretion to school officials to suspend or expel a student based on
nothing more than their personal opinion of whether an item "may be
evidence" of gang affiliation. Such a provision opens the door for dis-
criminatory enforcement and is unconstitutionally vague. To para-
phrase a long accepted axiom, "One man's evidence is another man's
nonsense. "200
196. DURHAM PUB. SCH., STUDENT CODE OF CONDUCT POLICY 4301.10 (2006) (emphasis
added), available at http://www.dpsnc.net/index.php?option=com-kb&Itemid=l&page=arti-
cles&articleid=130.
197. Id.
198. Stephenson, 110 F.3d at 1311.
199. DURHAM PUB. SCH. CODE OF STUDENT CONDUCT POLICY 4301.10, RULE 10 (2006),
available at http://www.dpsnc.net/index.php?option=com kb&Itemid=l&page=articles&article
id=129. Wake County likewise prohibits, "Wearing, possessing, using, distributing, displaying, or
selling any clothing, jewelry, emblems, badges, symbols, signs, visible tattoos and body markings,
or other items, or being in possession of literature that shows affiliation with a gang, or is evi-
dence of membership or affiliation in any gang or that promotes gang affiliation." WAKE
COUNTY BD. OF EDUC. BD. POLICY 6424(A), available at http://www.wcpss.net/policy-files/series/
policies/6424-bp.html.
200. Consider, for example, the admission of evidence obtained from "spectral sources,"
such as apparitions seen by the accusers, once used at the Salem witchcraft trials. DAVID
THOMAS KONIG, LAW & SOCIETY IN PURITAN MASSACHUSETTS: ESSEX COUNTY COUNTY, 1629-
1692 171-72 (Morris S. Arnold ed., University of North Carolina Press 1979).
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The Durham policy also provides that, "The superintendent/desig-
nee shall consult with law enforcement officials semi-annually to es-
tablish a list of gang-related items, symbols and behaviors. The
principal shall maintain this list in the main office of the school and
shall notify students of the items, symbols and behaviors prohibited by
this policy." A similar policy was before the court in Chalifoux v. New
Caney Independent School District.2" 1 The policy at issue in Chalifoux
provided, "A sample list of specific items that law enforcement agen-
cies consider gang-related is available in the principal's office."2 °2 The
court held the policy void for vagueness because it delegated to law
enforcement officers unfettered discretion to determine what items
represented gang apparel or symbols.2"3
To avoid the risk of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement by
school officials and school resource officers, a school district should
include a gang "validation" policy that identifies specific criteria suffi-
ciently indicative of gang membership. To validate an individual as a
gang member, statutes and school policies that require gang validation
typically require school officials to establish satisfaction of three or
more of the following criteria. The individual:
> is a self-proclaimed gang member;
> has tattoos of documented gang logos;
> demonstrates substantial knowledge of gang codes, hand signals,
colors, and activities;
> is found in possession of writing, drawings, or photographs impli-
cative of gang membership;
> is identified as a gang member by another law enforcement
agency or other official source, such as the military or the depart-
ment of corrections;
> is identified as a gang member by a parent or guardian;
> is identified as a criminal street gang member by a documented
reliable informant;
> is identified as a gang member by an informant of previously unt-
ested reliability whose identification is corroborated by indepen-
dent information;
> resides in or frequents a particular criminal street gang's area
and adopts their style of dress, their use of hand signs, or their
tattoos;
201. Chalifoux v. New Caney Indep. Sch. Dist., 976 F. Supp. 659, 669 (S.D. Tex. 1997).
202. Id. (emphasis in original).
203. Id.
20071
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> has been arrested more than once in the company of validated
gang members for offenses which are consistent with usual crimi-
nal street gang activity, such as home invasions, drive-by shoot-
ings, or drug-related offenses; or
> has been observed on four or more occasions in the company of
validated gang members.2 °4
School districts should not be permitted to maintain codes of student
conduct that fail to clearly inform students what conduct is prohibited
or that vest unchecked discretion in school officials. If local school
boards are unwilling to revise gang policies to prevent arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement, an action for declaratory judgment is
proper to challenge the policies as void for vagueness.20 5
III. POTENTIAL DEFENSES
A. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies
A motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies
is treated, "according to its substance, as one challenging a court's
subject matter jurisdiction" under Rule 12(b)(1).2 °6 Appellate review
of the trial court's order of dismissal for lack of subject matter juris-
diction is de novo. 20 7 "Under a de novo review, the court considers
the matter anew and freely substitutes its own judgment for that of the
[trial court]. '20  North Carolina courts have held that
in order to have standing for judicial review, five requirements must
be satisfied: (1) the petitioner is an aggrieved party; (2) there was a
final agency decision; (3) the decision was the result of a contested
case; (4) all administrative remedies have been exhausted; and (5)
there is no adequate procedure for judicial review under another
statute.209
204. See e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. § 13-105 (2006); FLA. STAT. § 874.03 (2006); IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 18-8502 (2006); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-10A-1-14 (2006); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-
121 (2006).
205. Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 261 (N.C. 1997) (action for declaratory judgment
proper to determine the construction and validity of school board policies).
206. Williams v. New Hanover County Bd. of Educ., 409 S.E.2d 753, 755 (N.C. Ct. App.
1991) (citing Harrell v. Whisenant, 281 S.E.2d 453,454 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981), disc. review denied,
288 S.E.2d 380 (N.C. 1982)).
207. Peninsula Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Crescent Res., LLC, 614 S.E.2d 351, 353 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2005) (citing Country Club of Johnston County, Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 563 S.E.2d
269, 274 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002). See also Fuller v. Easley, 553 S.E.2d 43, 46 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001)
("Our review of an order granting a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss is de novo.").
208. In re Appeal of the Greens of Pine Glen Ltd. P'ship, 576 S.E.2d 316, 319 (N.C. 2003)
(citing Mann Media, Inc. v. Randolph Cty. Planning Bd., 565 S.E.2d 9, 17 (N.C. 2002)).
209. Radcliffe v. City of Dunn, 636 S.E.2d 859, No. COA06-439, 2006 WL 3361524, at **1-2
(N.C. Ct. App., Nov. 21, 2006) (unpublished opinion) (citing Charlotte Truck Driver Training
Sch. v. N.C. DMV, 381 S.E.2d 861, 862 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989)). In Radcliffe, the court interpreted
and applied the definition of an "agency" under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 150B-2(la) (2005):
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The requirement that a plaintiff exhaust administrative remedies
before seeking judicial redress serves two main purposes:
First, exhaustion protects "administrative agency authority." Exhaus-
tion gives an agency "an opportunity to correct its own mistakes with
respect to the programs it administers before it is haled into [court],"
and it discourages "disregard of [the agency's] procedures." Second,
exhaustion promotes efficiency. Claims generally can be resolved
much more quickly and economically in proceedings before an agency
than in litigation in [court]. In some cases, claims are settled at the
administrative level, and in others, the proceedings before the agency
convince the losing party not to pursue the matter in [court]. "And
even where a controversy survives administrative review, exhaustion
of the administrative procedure may produce a useful record for sub-
sequent judicial consideration., 210
Exhaustion of either state judicial or state administrative remedies
is not a prerequisite to the invocation of federal relief in actions
brought under § 1983.211 This is especially true when violation of a
substantive constitutional right, such as equal protection, is the subject
of a § 1983 claim because the violation is complete when the prohib-
ited action is taken.212 Beginning in 1963 with McNeese v. Board of
Education, 213 the Supreme Court has "on numerous occasions re-
jected the argument that a § 1983 action should be dismissed where
the plaintiff has not exhausted state administrative remedies. 21 4 The
[A]n agency or an officer in the executive branch of the government of the State and in-
cludes the Council of the State, the Governor's Office, a board, a commission, a depart-
ment, a division, a council, and any other unit of government in the executive branch. A
local unit of government is not an agency.
(emphasis by court). The court held that the City of Dunn was "a unit of local government" and
therefore did not fall under the statutory definition of "agency" within the meaning of § 150B-
2(la). Id. at *2.
210. Woodford v. Ngo, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2385 (2006) (quoting McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S.
140, 145 (1992)).
211. Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 501 (1982) (employment discrimination based on
race and sex).
212. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled on other grounds, Monell v. Dep't Soc.
Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
It is no answer that the State has a law which if enforced would give relief. The federal
remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and
refused before the federal one is invoked. Hence the fact that Illinois by its constitution and
laws outlaws unreasonable searches and seizures is no barrier to the present suit in the
federal court.
Id. at 184. See also Edward Valves, Inc. v. Wake County, 471 S.E.2d 342 (N.C. 1996).
"[Olverlapping state remedies are generally irrelevant to the question of the existence of a cause
of action under § 1983." Id. at 347 (quoting Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 124 (1990)).
213. McNeese v. Bd. of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963).
214. Patsy, 457 U.S. at 500-01 (citing Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 63 n.10 (1979); Gibson v.
Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 574 (1973); Carter v. Stanton, 405 U.S. 669, 671 (1972); Wilwording v.
Swenson, 404 U.S. 249, 251 (1971); Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U.S. 639, 640 (1968); King v. Smith,
392 U.S. 309, 312, n.4 (1968); Damico v. California, 389 U.S. 416 (1967)) Cf. Steffel v. Thompson,
415 U.S. 452, 472-73 (1974). ("When federal claims are premised on [§ 1983] - as they are here -
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Court "has stated categorically that exhaustion is not a prerequisite to
an action under § 1983, and [has] not deviated from that position in
the nineteen years since McNeese,"21 5 regardless of whether the suit is
instituted in state or federal court.216
Two exceptions to this no-exhaustion rule have been recognized,
however. First, Congress may explicitly provide that state administra-
tive remedies must be exhausted before bringing suit under a particu-
lar federal law pursuant to § 1983. Second, Congress may implicitly
require the exhaustion of state administrative remedies where "the
obligation to require exhaustion of administrative remedies may be
fairly understood from congressional action." The mere provision of
state administrative remedies, however, is not enough to demonstrate
an implicit Congressional intent to impose an exhaustion requirement
on a plaintiff seeking to bring a § 1983 action. If there is doubt as to
whether an exception applies, courts should refrain from requiring ex-
haustion in § 1983 suits because "Patsy leaves no doubt that the pre-
sumption is strongly in favor of no exception. '2 17
Actions based on violations of procedural due process present a
more difficult question. The fundamental premise of procedural due
process protection is notice and the opportunity to be heard; the op-
portunity to be heard must be at a meaningful time and in a meaning-
ful manner.218 "An undue burden exists, and therefore a provision of
we have not required exhaustion of state judicial or administrative remedies, recognizing the
paramount role Congress has assigned to the federal courts to protect constitutional rights.").
215. Id. at 500. "Since Patsy, the Supreme Court, this court, and other circuit courts of ap-
peals have confirmed that, as a general rule, exhaustion of state administrative remedies is not
required prior to bringing suit under § 1983." Talbot v. Lucy Corr Nursing Home, 118 F.3d 215,
218 (4th Cir. 1997) (citing Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 523 (1990) ("The availability
of state administrative procedures ordinarily does not foreclose resort to § 1983.")); Felder v.
Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 147 (1988) ("[Pllaintiffs need not exhaust state administrative remedies
before instituting § 1983 suits in federal court."); VanHarken v. City of Chicago, 103 F.3d 1346,
1349 (7th Cir. 1997) (Patsy expressly rejected a requirement of exhausting administrative reme-
dies before suing under § 1983.); Jeremy H. v. Mt. Lebanon Sch. Dist, 95 F.3d 272, 283 n.20 (3d
Cir. 1996) ("[T]he policies of section 1983 strongly disfavor the imposition of additional exhaus-
tion requirements."); Thomquest v. King, 61 F.3d 837, 841 n.3 (11th Cir. 1995) ("[A] section
1983 claim cannot be barred by a plaintiffs failure to exhaust state administrative remedies with
respect to an unreviewed administrative action."); Woods v. Smith, 60 F.3d 1161, 1165 (5th Cir.
1995) ("[E]xhaustion of state judicial or administrative remedies is not a prerequisite to the
bringing of a section 1983 claim."); Wilbur v. Harris, 53 F.3d 542, 544 (2d Cir. 1995) (exhaustion
of state administrative remedies not required as prerequisite to action under § 1983); Hall v.
Marion Sch. Dist. No. Two, 31 F.3d 183, 190-91 (4th Cir. 1994) (exhaustion of state administra-
tive remedies not a prerequisite to § 1983 action)).
216. Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 138 (1988). See also Good Hope Hosp., Inc. v. N.C.
DHHS, 620 S.E.2d 873, 879 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005) ("State courts have concurrent jurisdiction
with federal courts over § 1983 claims, and may hear certain constitutional claims even if admin-
istrative remedies have not been exhausted.").
217. Talbot, 118 F.3d at 219 (citation omitted) (quoting Alacare, Inc.-N. v. Baggiano, 785
F.2d 963, 966-67 (11th Cir. 1986)) (emphasis in original).
218. PNE AOA Media, L.L.C. v. Jackson County, 554 S.E.2d 657, 664 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001).
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law is invalid, if its purpose or effect is to place a substantial obstacle
in the path of a party seeking to exercise her constitutional right.
2 19
When "[t]he question presented is the due process of fairness of the
procedures by which discipline in public schools is administered,
rather than the substantive correctness of the disciplinary decision or
punishment itself; . . . exhaustion of administrative remedies is not
required. '22°  Due process provides heightened protection against
government interference with fundamental rights and liberty inter-
ests.221 The equal opportunity to receive a public school education is
just such a fundamental right.
"A pleading that alleges inadequacy of administrative remedy states
a claim upon which equitable relief may be granted if the circum-
stances warrant it."'222 "[T]he exhaustion requirement may be excused
if the administrative remedy would be futile or inadequate. '223  "In
order, however, to rely upon futility or inadequacy, 'allegations of the
facts justifying avoidance of the administrative process must be pled in
the complaint."' 224 Inadequacy of administrative remedies may arise
in a number of circumstances.
The well-settled rule in North Carolina is that a constitutional chal-
lenge to a statute is "determined by the judiciary, not an administra-
tive board. ' 22 5  Because it is the province of the judiciary to make
219. Anderson v. Assimos, 553 S.E.2d 63, 68 n.4 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001) (internal quotations
omitted).
220. Givens v. Poe, 346 F. Supp. 202, 203 (W.D.N.C. 1972) (emphasis in original). "[T]here
are situations in which exhaustion serves no useful purpose. Courts universally recognize that
parents need not exhaust the procedures.., where resort to the administrative process would be
either futile or inadequate." Hoeft v. Tucson Unified School Dist., 967 F.2d 1298, 1303 (9th Cir.
1992) (citing Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 327 (1988); Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1014 n.17
(1984); Kerr Ctr. Parents Ass'n v. Charles, 897 F.2d 1463, 1469 (9th Cir. 1990); Wilson v. Marana
Unified Sch. Dist. No. 6, 735 F.2d 1178, 1181 (9th Cir. 1984)).
221. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S.
702, 720 (1997)).
222. Lloyd v. Babb, 251 S.E.2d 843, 851 (1979) (citing 2 COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW 579 (1965)).
223. Justice for Animals, Inc. v. Robeson County, 595 S.E.2d 773, 777 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004)
(citing Huang v. N.C. State Univ., 421 S.E.2d 812, 815 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992)).
224. Id. (quoting Bryant v. Hogarth, 488 S.E.2d 269, 273 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997), disc. review
denied, 494 S.E.2d 406 (N.C. 1997)). See also Jackson v. N.C. Dep't of Human Res., 505 S.E.2d
899, 904 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998), disc. review denied, 537 S.E.2d 213 (N.C. 1999) ("The burden of
showing inadequacy [of the administrative remedy] is on the party claiming inadequacy, who
must include such allegations in the complaint.").
225. Shell Island Homeowners Ass'n v. Tomlinson, 517 S.E.2d 406, 412 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999)
(quoting Meads v. N.C. Dep't of Agric., 509 S.E.2d 165,174 (N.C. 1998)). In Meads, defendant
agency argued lack of subject matter jurisdiction on grounds that the plaintiff had failed to ex-
haust administrative remedies by seeking a declaratory judgment from the agency as to the con-
stitutionality of the regulations at issue. The North Carolina Supreme Court stated:
[Defendant's] argument, however, ignores our well-settled rule that a statute's constitution-
ality shall be determined by the judiciary, not an administrative board. Because it is the
province of the judiciary to make constitutional determinations, any effort made by [plain-
tiff] to have the constitutionality of the ... regulations determined by [defendant agency]
37
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constitutional determinations, administrative remedies are inade-
quate, and plaintiffs are not required to exhaust them before bringing
a declaratory judgment action to challenge the constitutional validity
of a school board policy.226
In Lloyd v. Babb,227 a voting rights case, the available administra-
tive remedy would have required the plaintiffs to individually chal-
lenge the voting rights of between 6,000 and 10,000 persons. On that
basis, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that plaintiffs were not
provided an effective administrative remedy and that plaintiffs' claim
for equitable relief could properly go forward.228 In cases alleging ra-
cially disparate disciplinary actions, the same reasoning would apply.
In Copper v. Denlinger,229 for example, to support going forward as a
class action, plaintiffs alleged, "On information and belief and based
on statistics published by the Durham Public Schools, the class may
include as many as 10,000 Durham Public School students. 230
The school board's failure to properly publish disciplinary policies
and procedures may also render administrative remedies inade-
quate.231 By statute, local boards of education are required to
adopt policies not inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitutions
of the United States and North Carolina, governing the conduct of
students and establishing procedures to be followed by school officials
in suspending or expelling any student, or in disciplining any student if
the offensive behavior could result in suspension, expulsion, or the
administration of corporal punishment... Each local board shall pub-
would have been in vain. Accordingly, given the constitutional nature of this issue, the
[administrative remedies] were inadequate, and therefore [plaintiff] was not required to ex-
haust them.
Meads, 509 S.E.2d. at 174 (citing Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Gold, 118 S.E.2d 792 (N.C. 1961); John-
ston v. Gaston County, 323 S.E.2d 381 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984), disc. review denied, 329 S.E.2d 392
(N.C. 1985)).
226. Meads, 509 S.E.2d. at 174 (N.C. 1998).
227. Lloyd v. Babb, 251 S.E.2d 843 (N.C. 1979).
228. Id. at 851. In Lloyd, the plaintiffs alleged a pattern of illegal practices on the part of
election officials. The defendants responded that plaintiffs had failed to exhaust available ad-
ministrative remedies and moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The North Carolina court disagreed:
In this plaintiffs are essentially attempting to require election officials to perform their legal
duties. Plaintiffs' standing to make such a claim has not been challenged. Nor should their
failure to make challenges preclude them from seeking this kind of relief. If plaintiffs' alle-
gations are true, the challenge procedure would not provide an effective remedy. The chal-
lenge procedure might correct past wrongs by removing from the voting rolls those who had
been improperly registered. It could do nothing, however, to halt ongoing improprieties nor
could it prevent future ones. In summary, insofar as plaintiffs allege continuing improprie-
ties in the registration practices of [election officials] they have stated a claim upon which
relief can be granted.
Id. at 852.
229. Copper v. Denlinger, 06 CVS 03257 (N.C. filed Mar. 24, 2006), appeal docketed, No.
COA07-205, (N.C. Ct. App. Feb, 14, 2007).
230. Complaint at 18, Cooper (No. 06 CVS 03257).
231. Orange County v. N.C. Dept. of Transp., 265 S.E.2d 890, 908 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980).
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lish all the policies mandated by this subsection and make them availa-
ble to each student and his parent or guardian at the beginning of each
school year.232
It is not uncommon for school board policies to be "published," yet
not made "available" to all students and their parents. School board
policies that are published on-line are generally not available to eco-
nomically disadvantaged students and their families. Policies that are
not clearly written are likewise not available to many students and
parents. Administrative remedies provided by such policies are
inadequate.
While it is generally said that ignorance of the law is no excuse for a
failure to comply with the law, such a rule does not apply where the
citizen is, as a matter of practicality, denied a reasonable means for
finding out what the law is in the first place.... [I]t would contravene
the most rudimentary principles of due process for [the court] to deny
[suspended or expelled students] a right of judicial review because
they had not exhausted an administrative remedy ... which is effec-
tively hidden in the catacombs of the [school board] bureaucracy.233
The exhaustion requirement may be excused by futility of the ad-
ministrative remedy, as when a school board creates barriers or rou-
tinely fails to enforce its published disciplinary policies and
procedures. In Copper v. Denlinger, for example, plaintiffs alleged
that, as a common policy, custom, and practice, the superintendent of
Durham Public Schools intentionally failed to timely notify minority
students of their right to appeal a long-term suspension to the school
board, thereby effectively precluding exhaustion of their administra-
tive remedies. 234
Under section 115C-391 of the North Carolina General Statutes, a
student suspended for more than ten days by the superintendent may
appeal the superintendent's decision to the local board of education.
A decision of the local board on appeal or a decision of expulsion by
the local board is final and "is subject to judicial review in accordance
232. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-391(a) (2006) (emphasis added). These policies must also in-
clude "a reasonable dress code for students." Id.
233. Orange County, 265 S.E.2d at 908.
234. Copper, supra note 31, at $1 273-78. Two plaintiffs alleged that the superintendent
notified them by letter that she had approved the principal's recommendation of long-term sus-
pension for the remainder of the school year and advised them of their right to appeal her
decision to the school board by delivering written notice of appeal to her office by January 9,
2006. Plaintiffs alleged that the superintendent's letters, both of which were dated December 14,
2005, were not postmarked until January 14 and January 16, 2007, well after the appeal deadline
had expired. A third plaintiff, also suspended for the remainder of the school year, received no
notice, timely or otherwise, of his right to appeal the superintendent's decision to the school
board.
2007]
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with Article 4 of Chapter 150B of the General Statutes. 235 Under the
provisions governing the right to judicial review,
[a]ny person who is aggrieved by the final decision in a contested case,
and who has exhausted all administrative remedies made available to
him by statute or agency rule, is entitled to judicial review of the deci-
sion under this Article, unless adequate procedure for judicial review
is provided by another statute, in which case the review shall be under
such other statute. Nothing in this Chapter shall prevent any person
from invoking any judicial remedy available to him under the law to
test the validity of any administrative action not made reviewable
under this Article.236
In addition to allegations that administrative remedies were pre-
cluded by the failure to timely notify plaintiffs of their right to appeal
their suspensions, the complaint in Copper v. Denlinger also alleged
that, on December 13, 2004, the superintendent suspended one stu-
dent for the remainder of the school year, that the student's family
retained counsel, and that the school board ignored repeated letters
from counsel explaining that the student had missed the appeal dead-
line because his father was hospitalized for major surgery and asking
the board to extend the time to appeal the superintendent's decision
of long-term suspension. 37 Counsel's letters were dated February 17,
March 22, and April 5, 2005.238 In his March 22, 2005, letter, counsel
wrote, "The possible mistaken suspension of a student who has no
serious record of misbehavior and is academically accomplished,
should be seriously and timely considered. ' 239 Counsel's letter of
April 5, 2005, stated, "To refuse a hearing and state your reasons is
one thing. However, to simply ignore the plea of a parent and child
who have an arguable right to appeal is unconscionable," and that,
"The Constitution, case law and your Board Policy provide the oppor-
tunity for every student to challenge allegations made against them in
a long term suspension. This right has been denied to [the suspended
student] with no reason given. "240
On May 12, 2005, five months after the student was suspended,
three months after receiving the first letter from the student's retained
counsel, and with less than two weeks remaining in the school year,
the school board agreed to retroactively reduce the student's long-
term suspension to ten days.24 ' The board's delay of five months pro-
foundly impacted the student's educational progress and indicated a
235. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-391(e) (2006).
236. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-43 (2006).
237. Copper, supra note 234, at $1 138-52.
238. Id. at is 143, 145, 149.
239. Id. at 146.
240. Id. at it 150-51.
241. Id. at 1 152.
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careless, if not willful, disregard of his rights to a fair administrative
remedy. Regrettably, in many instances, disregard for the administra-
tive remedy denied to students of color is not the worst of it.
The futility of administrative remedies is all too evident when
school officials falsify documents to cut off a student's right to appeal
to the school board a superintendent's decision of long-term suspen-
sion 2 4 2 or when a school board willfully turns a deaf ear to repeated
complaints of equal protection and due process violations by the su-
perintendent and other school officials.243
While school policies may ostensibly provide administrative reme-
dies for students who are expelled or suspended long-term, if the ad-
ministrative remedies are inadequate, they need not be exhausted
before bringing claims based on equal protection or due process viola-
tions. Practitioners should be prepared to face these challenges head-
on.
B. Immunity
A defense based on immunity may be raised in a motion to dismiss
under Rule 12(b) made prior to any responsive pleading.244 At the
initial pleading stage, a defense of immunity is treated as a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), and the plain-
tiff's allegations of fact are taken as true.245 In ruling on a motion to
dismiss, a trial court may look only to the allegations of the complaint
to determine whether qualified immunity is established.246 Beyond
the initial motion to dismiss, defendants bear the burden of establish-
ing a justification for immunity.247
242. Id. at 1J 99-120. The complaint alleges that a student and his mother met with the
school principal and others on October 6, at which time the student was told he could return to
school on October 14. Upon his return to school on October 14, a counselor presented the
student with a letter from the superintendent dated October 8 approving a transfer request "ef-
fective immediately." The request was allegedly submitted by the school principal on October 2,
four days before he told the student he could return on October 14. These two documents made
it appear that the student had only been suspended short-term, from which he had no right to
appeal. The student was in fact suspended for thirteen days, or long-term, from which he was
owed a right to appeal his suspension.
243. Id. at T 517 ("In the fall of 2005, in response to growing public outcry against the ongo-
ing racial discrimination in Durham Public Schools, [white school board members] ordered the
arrest of the most outspoken citizens,... and refused to hear their complaints.").
244. Toomer v. Garrett, 574 S.E.2d 76, 86 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002), appeal dismissed & review
denied, 579 S.E.2d 576 (N.C. 2003).
245. Meyer v. Walls, 471 S.E.2d 422, 429 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996). See also Toomer, 574 S.E.2d
at 86 (when raised by motion, immunity generally raised by Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss).
246. Toomer, 574 S.E.2d at 86 (citing McWaters v. Rick, 195 F. Supp. 2d 781, 789 (E.D. Va.
2002)). See also Harwood v. Johnson, 388 S.E.2d 439, 442-43 (1990) (motion to dismiss properly
granted where a defendant is immune from suit under alleged facts taken as true).
247. Hyatt v. Town of Lake Lure, 225 F. Supp. 2d 647, 656 (W.D.N.C. 2002). See also Ste-
phenson v. Town of Garner, 524 S.E.2d 608, 612 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000) (burden on defendant to
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1. Sovereign Immunity
The doctrine of sovereign immunity is not available as a defense to
claims based on federal law,248 nor does it bar claims brought under
the North Carolina State Constitution. "[W]hen there is a clash be-
tween ... constitutional rights and sovereign immunity, the constitu-
tional rights must prevail. 249 "[T]he doctrine of sovereign immunity
does not bar a direct claim against the State when the claim is based
on a violation of the Declaration of Rights of the North Carolina
Constitution. 25
0
In Fennell v. Stephenson, the trial court dismissed plaintiff's action
alleging a pattern and practice of racially-influenced traffic stops of
Black motorists by the North Carolina Highway Patrol. The North
Carolina Court of Appeals reversed. "Because this claim alleged a
violation of [plaintiff's] right to equal protection under the North Car-
olina Constitution, the Highway Patrol was not entitled to assert the
doctrine of sovereign immunity as a defense to this claim. 2
51
2. Qualified Immunity
In certain cases brought under § 1983, qualified immunity may
serve to protect government officials from personal liability.252
Whether qualified immunity should shield an officer from personal
liability depends on three considerations: (1) whether the plaintiff has
identified a specific constitutional right; (2) whether that right is
clearly established; and (3) whether a reasonable person in the of-
ficer's position would have known the actions complained of would
violate that right.253 Defendants have the burden to establish the de-
fense of qualified immunity.254
The first two considerations, whether plaintiffs have identified a
specific constitutional right and whether that right is clearly estab-
lished, are questions of law for the court, more properly decided at the
justify legislative immunity); Moore v. Evans, 476 S.E.2d 415, 425-26 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996) (bur-
den on defendant to justify qualified immunity).
248. Corum v. Univ. of N.C., 413 S.E.2d 276 (N.C. 1992). See also Ripetlino v. N.C. Sch. Bd.
Ass'n, 581 S.E.2d 88, 93 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003) (sovereign immunity no bar to actions brought
under § 1983).
249. Corum, 413 S.E.2d at 292.
250. Fennell v. Stephenson, 528 S.E.2d 911, 917-18 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000) (quoting Corum,
413 S.E.2d at 292). See also Fabrikant v. Currituck County, 621 S.E.2d 19, 25 (N.C. 2005) (for
purposes of motion to dismiss, complaint need only allege facts that, if taken as true, are suffi-
cient to establish waiver of sovereign immunity and lack of specificity is not fatal).
251. See Fennell, 528 S.E.2d at 918.
252. Moore v. Evans, 476 S.E.2d 415, 425 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996).
253. Id. at 425-46 (citing Pritchett v. Alford, 973 F.2d 307, 312 (4th Cir. 1992)).
254. Id.
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summary judgment stage. 255 For purposes of a motion to dismiss, the
allegations in a plaintiff's complaint must be accepted as true. The
threshold inquiry is whether plaintiffs' allegations, taken as true, es-
tablish a constitutional violation.256
The second inquiry, whether the identified right was clearly estab-
lished, is also a question of law.25 7 In making this determination, the
Court need not look beyond decisions of the United States Supreme
Court, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court of
North Carolina.2 5 8 A public school student's constitutional rights to
due process and equal protection are clearly and incontrovertibly
well-established.259
The third consideration, whether a reasonable person in the of-
ficer's position would have known that challenged actions would vio-
late that right, requires a factual determination of any disputed
aspects of the officer's conduct.26 ° The finder of fact must first deter-
mine "whether the conduct at issue actually occurred," and if so,
"whether a reasonable officer would have known that his conduct
would violate" the right identified.261 If there are disputed questions
of fact regarding the officer's conduct, this inquiry cannot be answered
as matter of law, even at the summary judgment stage.2 6 2
3. Public Official Immunity
Public official immunity protects public officials from personal lia-
bility for negligence. 263 In proper cases, a public official "engaged in
the performance of governmental duties involving the exercise of
judgment and discretion" is shielded from liability unless his actions
"'were allegedly: (1) corrupt; (2) malicious; (3) outside of and beyond
the scope of his duties; (4) in bad faith; or (5) willful and deliber-
255. Davis v. Town of S. Pines, 449 S.E.2d 240, 244 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994) (citing Pritchett v.
Alford, 973 F.2d 307, 313 (4th Cir. 1992)).
256. Hyatt v. Town of Lake Lure, 225 F. Supp. 2d 647, 663 (W.D.N.C. 2002) (citing Hope v.
Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 736 (2002)). See also id. (whether plaintiff has identified specific constitu-
tional right is a question of law for the court).
257. Id.
258. Id. at 663-64.
259. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (student's right of due process); Brown v.
Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493-96 (1954) (equal rights to public education); Hyatt v. Town of
Lake Lure, 225 F. Supp. 2d 647 (W.D.N.C. 2002) (equal protection under the federal and state
constitutions is a clearly established right of which a reasonable public official would have
known), cited with approval in Toomer v. Garrett, 574 S.E.2d 76, 87 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002).
260. Davis, 449 S.E.2d at 244 (citing Lee v. Greene, 442 S.E.2d 547, 550 (N.C. Ct. App.
1994)).
261. Id.
262. Id. at 246. See also Lee, 442 S.E.2d at 550 (summary judgment improper if there are
disputed questions of fact regarding the officers' conduct).
263. Meyer v. Walls, 489 S.E.2d 880, 888 (N.C. 1997).
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ate."' 264 However, immunity does not apply when the official is en-
gaged in purely ministerial functions. 65
4. Legislative Immunity
School board members may sometimes assert the defense of legisla-
tive immunity. To establish this defense, defendants must show: (1)
they were acting in a legislative capacity when the challenged acts
were committed; and (2) their acts were not illegal.266 Illegal acts of
race discrimination are not "in aid of legislative activity" for purposes
of legislative immunity. 67
5. Quasi-Judicial Immunity
If applicable, the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity protects indi-
vidual public school officials from personal liability.268
In determining whether quasi-judicial immunity should be available,
courts consider three main criteria: (1) whether the official's functions
are similar to those of a judge; (2) whether a strong need exists for the
official to perform essential functions for the public good without fear
of harassment and intimidation; and (3) whether adequate procedural
safeguards exist to protect against constitutional deprivations.269
A complaint, which does not allege actions taken by school defend-
ants during hearings related to disciplinary actions and appeals, does
not give rise to quasi-judicial immunity as a possible defense.
C. The Political Question Doctrine
The political question doctrine is "based on constitutional provi-
sions relating to the distribution of powers among the branches of
government, and it is as a function of the separation of powers that
political questions are not determinable by the judiciary., 270 Under
the political question doctrine, a question may become "not justiciable
• . . because of the separation of powers provided by the Constitu-
tion. ''271 "The... doctrine excludes from judicial review those contro-
264. Id. at 888-89 (quoting Smith v. Hefner, 68 S.E.2d 783, 787 (N.C. 1952)).
265. See Hyatt v. Town of Lake Lure, 225 F. Supp. 2d 647, 657 (W.D.N.C. 2002) ("Insofar as
the acts of composing and sending letters to Plaintiff might be grounds for liability, these acts of
Defendant Place are ministerial in nature and not entitled to immunity.").
266. Stephenson v. Town of Garner, 524 S.E.2d 608, 612 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000) (citing Vereen
v. Holden, 468 S.E.2d 471, 473 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996)).
267. See e.g., Scott v. Greenville County, 716 F.2d 1409, 1422 (4th Cir. 1983) (illegal acts,
such as bribery, "obviously" are not in aid of legislative activity).
268. Hyatt, 225 F. Supp. 2d at 656.
269. Howard v. Food Lion, Inc., 232 F. Supp. 2d 585, 595 (M.D.N.C. 2002).
270. 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 309 (2006).
271. Bacon v. Lee, 549 S.E.2d 840, 854 (N.C. 2001) (quoting Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S.
486, 517 (1969)).
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versies which revolve around policy choices and value determinations
constitutionally committed for resolution to the halls of Congress or
the confines of the Executive Branch. The Judiciary is particularly ill-
suited to make such decisions .... "272
School defendants may move to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1)
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on grounds that claims relating
to adoption, interpretation, and enforcement of school policies are
non-justiciable under the political question doctrine. The North Caro-
lina Supreme Court has specifically addressed and rejected this
argument. 73
It has long been understood that it is the duty of the courts to deter-
mine the meaning of the requirements of our Constitution. When a
government action is challenged as unconstitutional, the courts have a
duty to determine whether that action exceeds constitutional limits.
Therefore, it is the duty of this Court to address plaintiff-parties' con-
stitutional challenge to the state's public education system. Defend-
ants' argument is without merit.274
As the Supreme Court observed even before Brown v. Board of
Education,
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects
from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond
the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal prin-
ciples to be applied by the courts. One's right to life, liberty, and
property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assem-
bly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they
depend on the outcome of no elections. 275
IV. CONCLUSION
Ubuntu276
The North Carolina State Constitution decrees that, "Religion, mo-
rality, and knowledge being necessary to good government and the
272. Id. (quoting Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 230,
(1986)).
273. Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249 (N.C. 1997).
274. Id. at 253-54 (citing Mitchell v. N.C. Indus. Dev. Fin. Auth., 159 S.E.2d 745, 750 (N.C.
1968); Ex parte Schenck, 65 N.C. 353, 367 (1871); Bayard v. Singleton, 1 N.C. 5, 6-7 (1787)). See
also Maready v. City of Winston-Salem, 467 S.E.2d 615, 620 (N.C. 1996) ("It is the duty of this
Court to ascertain and declare the intent of the framers of the Constitution and to reject any act
in conflict therewith."). Cf Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 209-10 (1962) ("[I]f 'discrimination is
sufficiently shown, the right to relief under the equal protection clause is not diminished by the
fact that the discrimination relates to political rights."') (quoting Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1,
11 (1944)).
275. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
276. Ubuntu, a Bantu word, defines what it means to be truly human. "We affirm our
humanity when we acknowledge that of others." Buzzle.com: Intelligent Life on the Web,
available at http://www.buzzle.com/editorials/7-22-2006-103206.asp.
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happiness of mankind, schools, libraries, and the means of education
shall forever be encouraged. ' 277 Congress has declared it to be:
the policy of the United States that a high quality education for all
individuals and a fair and equal opportunity to obtain that education
are a societal good, are a moral imperative, and [will] improve the life
of every individual, because the quality of our individual lives ulti-
mately depends on the quality of the lives of others.
278
What we in America have yet to grasp is that our civic health is simi-
larly indivisible. We have embarked on a path of triage, lost in the
fantasy that by banishing children at risk from our schools, we are
delivering law, order, and morals. On the contrary: there is no moral-
ity in depriving any child of the most basic tools she needs to succeed
in life, and there is no order in constructing what threatens to be a
large, enduring, and hopeless underclass.,
279
With each passing day, our young people journey further along the
uncertain road to adulthood. The nature of their journey, the kind of
adults they will become, the lives they will lead, the joy they will
know, the good they will do, will be profoundly influenced by the edu-
cational opportunities open to them along the way. Without question,
providing our children a safe environment in which to learn is a criti-
cal concern. Just as critical, however, is what they are to learn in that
environment.
Zero tolerance does not teach citizenship. It teaches racial mistrust
by perpetuating the stereotype of young black men and other children
of color as gang members and criminals. It teaches cowardliness. It
teaches self-interest, disrespect, and intolerance. It teaches dishonesty
and irresponsibility. It teaches bigotry. It teaches complicity. It is a lie.
In far too many instances, zero tolerance is a pretext offered by school
boards and school officials to avoid their duty to provide an equal
educational opportunity to all students and to teach poor minority
Ubunto really means that I am because you are. We belong together. Our humanity is
bound up with one another. We say in our languages, a person is a person through other
persons. A solitary human being is a contradiction in terms. I learn how to become a human
being through association with other human beings.
ABDULKADER TAYOB & WOLFRAM WEISSE, RELIGION AND POLITICs IN SouTH AFRICA: FROM
APARTHEID TO DEMOCRACY 72 (Waxmann Publishing Co. 1999) (quoting Desmond Tutu as
quoted by Hallencreutz and Palmberg).
277. N.C. CONST. art. IX § 1.
278. Improving America's School Act of 1994, 20 U.S.C.S. § 6301(a)(1) (1994).
279. Blumenson and Nilsen, supra note 107, at 117. "On average, a high school dropout
costs society between $243,000 and $388,000 over his or her lifetime due to both a lack of pro-
ductivity and dependence on government subsidies." Alicia C. Insley, Suspending and Expelling
Children from Educational Opportunity: Time to Reevaluate Zero Tolerance Policies, 50 AM. U.
L. REV. 1039, 1065 (2001) (citing Howard N. Snyder & Melissa Sickmund, U.S. Dep't of Just.,
Juvenile Offenders & Victims: 1999 National Report 82-83). Noting that lack of education im-
poses even higher costs on society when high school dropouts become involved in crime or drug
use, in which case the societal cost rises to between $1.7 and $2.3 million dollars over a lifetime.
Id.
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children the skills they will need to walk away from poverty and take
their rightful place in our community.
No child should be denied the benefit of a public school education
except in the most compelling circumstances and then only after the
accused child is afforded the rights of due process guaranteed by the
Constitutions of the United States and the State of North Carolina. In
a nation that pledges allegiance to the precepts of liberty and justice
for all, the frequency with which racial animus deprives our most vul-
nerable citizens of their fundamental, constitutionally mandated civil
rights remains a shadow of shame.28 ° When public school officials fail
to honor the pledge of allegiance and the promise of Brown v. Board
of Education, persons of integrity and ability, especially members of
the legal profession, must step forward on their behalf.
Consider this a call to arms.
280. See JOE R. FEAGIN, RACIST AMERICA: ROOTS, CURRENT REALTIES AND FUTURE REPA-
RATIONS 128 (New York: Routledge 2000). Most white Americans today believe that racial op-
pression is no longer a problem in this country. They are mistaken. "Today most white
Americans greatly underestimate the degree to which the nation is still such a total racist soci-
ety." Id. at 26. "In one way or another, all black Americans continue to suffer discrimination
because white domination of black Americans and other people of color remains a major or-
ganizing principle for life in the United States." Id. at 128.
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